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The inherent complexity of the processes and the volatile nature of petroleum 
products compel the petroleum industry to continually seek and develop tools and 
techniques to identify, evaluate, and mitigate potential risks that can negatively impact 
their process operations.  Additionally, government agencies and nonprofit professional 
societies guide the petroleum industry with regulatory guidelines, standards, and 
recommended best practices.  The industry and these agencies and societies work to 
improve operational management, to ensure safe working conditions, and to minimize 
risk of all kinds, so that if failures occur, damage is contained within tolerable limits 
(Health and Safety Executives, 2013).  
The currently used of both qualitative and quantitative risk assessment tools “fall 
short in identifying and ranking potential risks” in the petroleum industry and they “fail 
to demonstrate that risks have been reduced as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)” 
(Fitzgerald, 2004, p. 3).  Moreover, the tools are “limited to large, complex, and 
expensive studies” (Fitzgerald, 2004, p. 3).  Because accidents due to both human errors 
and electromechanical failures still occur and result in various consequences, critics have 
raised concerns about the petroleum industry’s safety and risk mitigation credentials and 
question its ability to prevent major accidents.   
The purpose of this research is to introduce new methods that provide more 
detailed and structure information to decision makers. They are more robust and easier-
to-use so that novice engineers can successfully apply them without experts’ need.  This 
dissertation employs the publication option, where the research results are reported by 
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The petroleum industry’s commitment to safety has been criticized due to some 
catastrophic highly publicized accidents.  For example, in December 2, 1984, more than 
40 tons of methyl-isocyanate gas leaked from the Bhopal pesticide plant in India.  This 
accident immediately killed more than 3,800 people, and an additional fifteen thousand 
died over the next few years as a result of inhaling the toxic fumes.  Union Carbide India 
Limited (UNCIL) paid more than $470 million compensations (Broughton, The Bhopal 
disaster and its aftermath: a review, 2005).  In July 6, 1988, the worst offshore accidents 
in the petroleum industry occurred off the coast of Aberdeen, Scotland in the North Sea.  
The Piper Alpha platform exploded, killing 167 out of the 228 crew members on board.  
The explosion destroyed the platform and the subsequent fires took three weeks to be 
brought under control.  The damage greatly impacted the oil production in that sector, 
thus the company suffered more than $3.4 billion in financial losses (Cullen, 1993).  In 
June 25, 2000, while maintenance crews were attempting to control a gas leak from a 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) pipeline at Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC) 
refinery, an explosion occurred and destroyed the entire facility.  The explosion killed 
five workers who were near the leakage and injured more than 50 workers who were 
performing their routine maintenance activities on site.  KNPC suffered financial losses 
exceeding $840 million from production losses, export operations, and cost to rebuild the 
facility.   
Domestically, a series of explosions destroyed BP’s Texas City Refinery during 
the start-up process of their Hydrocarbon-Isomerization unit in March 25, 2003.  The 
accident resulted in 15 casualties and more than 170 workers were injured.   This accident 
impacted BP financially with more than $2 billion in penalties and other compensations 
(Saleh, Haga, Favarò, & Bakolas, 2014). In April 20, 2010, Trans-Ocean’s Deepwater 
Horizon rig experienced a disastrous blowout while preparing to move-off of the well in 
BP’s Macondo Prospect of the Mississippi Canyon block 252 in the Gulf of Mexico.  Of 
the 126 crewmembers onboard the rig, 11 were killed in the initial explosion and many of 
the rest of the surviving crewmembers were air lifted to get medical treatment.  The rig 
sank after burning for two days.  This blowout resulted in the worst environmental 
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catastrophe in U.S. history by gushing more than 4.9 million barrels of crude oil into the 
Gulf of Mexico.  In addition, BP suffered financial losses exceeding $25 billion (Kerr, 
Kintisch, & Stokstad, 2010).  In August 25, 2012, a gas leak in Venezuela’s Paraguana 
Refinery Complex created a massive explosion, destroying the refinery, and killing 41 
workers (Petroleumworld.com, 2014).   
Major petroleum industry accidents such as these result in many significant 
impacts.  Environmentally, oil spills and their refined products contain toxins that 
contaminate both land and marine ecosystems (The Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation, 2013). For example, hydrocarbon products do not 
dissolve in water.  As a result, the thick layer of sludge can block plankton and 
photosynthetic aquatic plants (sea-life food) from reproduction,  prevent birds from flying 
due to oil caught on their feathers, and kill fish and other marine life due to asphyxiation 
(The Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation, 2013).  Moreover, 
the environmental damage includes underwater soils and reefs that are natural habitat to 
marine life (Ronza, Lázaro-Touza, Caro, & Joaquim, 2009). A major tool used to battle 
oil spills is the use of chemical dispersant agents, but these have their own toxicity and 
deleterious effects, regardless of their benefits in dispersing crude oil (Etkin, 1999).  As a 
final example, more than eight hundred Kuwaiti oil wells were set on fire by retreating 
Iraqi forces during the 1999 Desert Storm war, producing a terrible and senseless 
environmental disaster (Seacor, 1994).   
Human health and wellness have been impacted by major accidents in the 
petroleum industry.  The Bhopal gas leak disaster in 1984 killed more than 3800 in the 
first few days of the accident as a result of inhaling Methyl-Isocyanate (MIC) gas 
(Sharma, 2002).  Moreover, an estimate of 15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths reportedly 
occurred in the subsequent two decades following the accident, as the Indian government 
reported that more than half a million people were exposed to the gas (Broughton, 2005).  
Seactor (1994) reported an increase lung cancer and skin diseases in Kuwait due to 
exposure to toxins from burned hydrocarbons from Kuwaiti oil wells.  The 1988 Piper 
Alpha explosion claimed one hundred sixty seven lives, but many more of lost crew 
members’ families and relatives were psychologically impacted due to the loss of their 
loved ones (Kirchsteiger, 1999). 
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Financially, nearby communities and various stakeholders suffered from the 
impact of the petroleum accidents.  Financial impacts include operational losses instead 
of profit, loss in compensation, and legal penalties.  Accidents suspend operations 
causing a loss of production and downtime losses, reducing a company’s marginal profit 
(Cohen, 1993).  The tourism industry in the Gulf Coast generates an average of $34 
billion in revenues; the Deepwater Horizon oil spill resulted in contaminating the Gulf 
shores and resulted in a significant loss of $11 billion due to tourists avoiding those areas.   
To recoup their losses, Gulf shore business owners such as real estate, recreation, and 
fisheries, filed civil lawsuits from which BP could face $20 billion in legal penalties 
(Perry, 2011).  These accidents and many more, are some of the few examples that 
negatively impacted the petroleum industry (Anderson & LaBelle, 1994; Davies, 2010).  
Table 1 list 15 example cases out of a 319 major industrial accidents since 1917.  Of the 
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 The inherent complexity of the processes and volatile nature of petroleum 
products compel the petroleum industry to continually seek and develop tools and 
techniques to identify, evaluate, and mitigate potential risks that can negatively impact 
their process operations.  Additionally, government agencies and nonprofit professional 
societies guide the petroleum industry with regulatory guidelines, standards, and 
recommended best practices.  The industry and these agencies and societies work to 
improve operational management, to ensure safe working conditions and to minimize risk 
of all kinds, so that if failure occur, damage is contained within tolerable limits (Health 
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and Safety Executives, 2013).  Important in this are risk assessment tools, which are used 
to assist in the systematic identification and assessment of risk.   
The currently used qualitative and quantitative risk assessment tools “fall short in 
identifying and ranking potential risks” in the petroleum industry and they “fail to 
demonstrate that risks have been reduced as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)” 
(Fitzgerald, 2004, p. 3).   Moreover, the current qualitative and quantitative risk 
assessment tools are “limited to large, complex, and expensive studies” (Fitzgerald, 2004, 
p. 3).  Because accidents due to both human error and electro-mechanical failures still 
occur and result in various consequences, critics have raised concerns about the 
petroleum industry’s safety and risk mitigation credentials and question its to prevent 
future major accidents.   
The purpose of this research is to introduce several new accident causation, risk 
ranking and assessment, and mitigation strategy selection methods which provide more 
detailed and structure information to decision makers.  These new methods, though 
sophisticated, are more robust and easier-to-use so that novice engineers can successfully 
apply them.  They do not require experts.  This dissertation employs the publication 
option, where the research results are report by presenting the text of five 
journal/conference publication. 
The first paper titled “STAMP - Holistic System Safety Approach or Just Another 
Risk Model?” is published in the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries.  
Researchers in the safety field are facing more challenges everyday with the expanding 
modern socio-technical systems. Safety analysis such as hazard analysis, accident 
causation analysis, and risk assessment are being revisited to overcome the shortcoming 
of the conventional safety analysis. Different risk assessment models have been analyzed 
to explore both their advantages and disadvantages (Altabbakh, Murray, Damle, & 
Grantham, 2012). However, with increasingly complex human system interaction in 
today’s modern systems, new safety challenges are being faced that need to be assessed 
and addressed. Indeed, new or improved risk assessment tools that can address these 
complexities are needed.  Unlike conventional accident causation models, System 
Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes (STAMP) is not based on chain of events. It is 
based on system theory where each level or the organization plays a major role in 
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contributing to an accident or attaining successful system safety controls. Thus, STAMP 
prevails conventional accident models by accounting for organizational factors, human 
error, and adaptation to change over time. In STAMP, system safety is not achieved by 
preventing component failure measures; in fact, it is achieved by enforcing safety 
constraints continuously (Leveson, 2004). Therefore, accidents do not occur because of 
failure of components, they occur because of ineffective safety constraint where main 
focus is not on how to prevent failure, but on how to design better safety controls.  
The second paper titled “Investigating New Risk Reduction and Mitigation in the 
Oil and Gas Industry” is also published in the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process 
Industries.  The paper addresses the need for an early and precise risk assessment is 
essential to forecast and mitigate potential accidents from taking place, especially at the 
conceptual design stages (M.F. Milazzo, 2013; Lough et. al, 2009). The team developed 
Risk in Early Design (RED) theory to generate a list of possible product risks.  The 
software allows users with limited experience to predict both when and where a product 
may fail by simply knowing the function of their product.  The product risks are based on 
historical data of product input function and rank them by their occurrence likelihood and 
consequence (Lough et. al, 2008). Functioning as both as failure mode identification and 
risk ranking tool, Risk in Early Design (RED) is custom software that allows users to 
leverage failures from other products to help predict what may go wrong with the user's 
product.  RED promotes failure prevention by identifying failure risks as early as the 
conceptual design phase, where impacts of failure prevention are furthermost. It does this 
by using subject specific knowledge-bases populated by historical failure events in a 
variety of categories such as product failures, software failures, and business failures.  
The user simply selects the functions of the item that is undergoing a risk assessment and 
the type of assessment desired. The information quickly communicated by the RED 
software is the function (i.e. potential failure location), failure mode, risk likelihood, and 
risk consequence via mathematical mapping processes (Grantham Lough, Stone, & 
Tumer, 2005). It also categorizes the output into high, medium, and low risk areas.  To 
verify RED’s capability in identifying failure modes, approximately thirty major 
accidents due to electro-mechanical failures were randomly selected to undergo the 
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evaluation.  Hence, the software was not originally designed to identify potential failure 
modes in the oil and gas industry.   
The first step in performing an accurate RED analysis is selecting the functions 
performed by components in the system.  These functions can be selected from a list of 
“electromechanical functions” cataloged in the RED software tool.  The analysis 
identifies potential causes of failures that could interrupt operations.  The generated RED 
analysis signifies failure modes for the selected component.  In order to verify the results 
of RED analysis, accident reports issued by either government agencies were cross-
referenced.  Hence, the reports identify both the component location and the cause of the 
failure.  Four case studies with different causes of failure modes are list to demonstrate 
the capability of the software to identify failure modes contributed to the accidents.  
The third paper titled “Exploring Risk Reduction and Strategy Selection 
Methodologies in the Petroleum Industry” is an accepted conference paper in the 6th 
International Conference on Applied Human Factors and Ergonomics.  The paper 
addresses proposed solutions are providing prompt and inexpensive tool to risk 
identification, ranking and mitigation of potential electromechanical failure modes in the 
petroleum industry by applying both Risk in Early Design (RED) and Generated Risk 
Effect Event Neutralization (GREEN), respectively.  The specific applications of their 
approaches will focus on the following petroleum production systems such as, but not 
limited to, pipelines, gas turbines, pumps, heat exchangers, and distributed control 
systems (DCS).  These focused areas were chosen since they have a high failure rate 
(EPA, 2013; Barends et. al, 2012) and both RED and GREEN have shown to reduce and 
mitigate risks of electromechanical failure modes in these types of electromechanical 
components in previous work (Lough et. al, 2009).  RED identifies, and ranks, potential 
failure modes with their locations in electromechanical products (Lough et. al, 2009). 
GREEN recommends risk mitigation strategies methods to reduce the failure mode 
likelihood and/or consequence (Krus & Grantham, 2013).  The major difference between 
the products in the petroleum industry and those in which RED and GREEN have been 
previously tested is the operations environment.  The new addition to this tool is 
amalgamating the human factor aspect in the industry due to its importance with the 
merging complex technologies.  The close interaction between human and machines in a 
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very volatile process environment makes it necessary to consider human system 
integration and human factors part of the overall system design.  Hence, this consecration 
will look into risk from different perspectives resulting in design safety and operating 
efficiency.   
“Safety Awareness in Undergraduate Students” is the title of the fourth paper 
submitted to the Professional Safety Journal.  It discusses accidents among engineering 
and science students in college workshops and labs have resulted in either severe injuries 
or tragic fatalities. Students with technical majors are required to take scientific 
laboratory courses and they apply their knowledge by engaging in various competitive 
technical design teams.  Such involvement requires them to spend time in labs and/or 
workshops, both of which can be hazardous environments. Consequently, college 
students’ safety mindset can be essential in both in and outside the classroom setting. In a 
few years, and after earning their degrees, these students will put their knowledge into 
practice to be engineers and scientists in the workforce. Their safety awareness and 
attitude towards risk is often being formed in college and will follow them into their 
professional career. In an effort to prevent accidents and improve safety cognition in 
young engineers and scientist, this study examines the training exposure and knowledge 
within technical competition teams from the students’ perspectives. A survey targeting 
different OSHA safety areas was conducted to measure safety training, knowledge, and 
attitude of these undergraduate students. The paper, also, explores potential causes of 
unsafe decision making by the students surveyed. 
Finally, the fifth paper titled “Bridging the Health, Safety, and Environment Risk 
Management Proficiency Gap for Future Petroleum Engineers” focuses on investing in 
human capital, by establishing health, safety, and environmental risk management course 
to young engineers as another method of risk mitigation due to ongoing demand for more 
HSE engineers to be part of the petroleum industry.  The expansion of the oil industry 
resulted in a scarcity of these engineers to overlook both the performance of process 
operations and potential risk management strategies.  The paper also defines the 
establishment of a new focus area in health, safety, and environment risk management in 
the petroleum engineering program at Missouri University of Science and Technology.  
The goal of the program is to meet the job market demand for engineers in that focus area 
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in petroleum engineering.  In addition, the availability of the program will enhance 
student’s communications skills, safety awareness, ethical responsibilities, and most 
importantly, creating an improved safety culture by exposing different health, safety and 





I. STAMP – HOLISTIC SYSTEM SAFETY APPROACH OR JUST ANOTHER 
RISK MODEL? 
 
Hanan Altabbakh, Missouri S&T 
 Mohammad Alkazimi, Missouri S&T 
 Susan Murray, Missouri S&T 




Risk management has a number of accident causation models that have been used 
for a number of years. Dr. Nancy Leveson (2002) has developed a new model of 
accidents using a systems approach. The new model is called Systems Theoretic Accident 
Modeling and Processes (STAMP). It incorporates three basic components: constraints, 
hierarchical levels of control, and process loops. In this model, accidents are examined in 
terms of why the controls that were in place did not prevent or detect the hazard(s) and 
why these controls were not adequate to enforcing the system safety constraints. A 
STAMP accident analysis is presented and its usefulness in evaluating system safety is 
compared to more traditional risk models. STAMP will be applied to a case study in the 




Risk assessment, Accident causation, Hazard analysis, Human error, Complex System
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1. Introduction  
Researchers in the safety field are facing more challenges everyday with the 
expanding modern socio-technical systems. Safety analysis such as hazard analysis, 
accident causation analysis, and risk assessment are being revisited to overcome the 
shortcoming of the conventional safety analysis. With increasingly complex human 
system interaction in today’s modern systems, new safety challenges are been faced that 
needed to be assessed and addressed. Indeed, new or improved risk assessment tools that 
can address these complexities are needed.  
 
2. Hazard Analysis  
Hazard analyses are tools used to detect and classify hazards within a system, 
subsystem, components, and their interactions. The main purpose of the analysis is to 
identify hazardous conditions or risks and eliminate them or mitigate them (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2008). Hazard analyses identify hazards, their consequences, 
and their causes to determine system risk and means of mitigating or eliminating those 
hazards (Ericson, 2005). Ericson categorized hazard analyses into types and techniques.  
Types would typically determine analysis timing, depth of details and system 
coverage; while techniques would specify the methodology used in the analysis. There 
are seven types of hazard analysis with regards to system safety (Ericson, 2005):  
 Conceptual design hazard analysis type (CD-HAT) (concept) 
 Preliminary design hazard analysis type (PD-HAT) (preliminary) 
 Detailed design hazard analysis type (DD-HAT) (preliminary) 
 System design hazard analysis type (SD-HAT) (test) 
 Operations design hazard analysis type (OD-HAT) (test) 
 Health design hazard analysis type (HD-HAT) (operation) 
 Requirements design hazard analysis type (RD-HAT) (final design) 
 
Each category describes a stage of system life, details required from analyses, 
information available to begin with, and analysis outcome. There are more than 100 
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hazard analysis techniques available (Stephens & Talso, 1999; Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2008). 
Hazards analysis not only identifies what could fail in a system, but also identifies 
the potential consequences, the reason why it could happen, what are the causal factors, 
and the likelihood of it happening. Unfortunately, conventional hazard analyses are more 
focused on direct cause and effect relationship following the famous dominos chain of 
events (Hollnagel, 2004). There are several techniques for hazard analysis to be 
considered when assessing hazards in a system. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), and Hazard and 
Operability Analysis (HAZOP) are examples of the traditional ones. However, the 
available tools are not designed to accommodate all the different complex systems 
available. It is the job of the analyst to choose the model that best fit the system under 
investigation. Depending on the type of risks to be assessed, whether risks at components 
level, human error, human machine interaction or organizational level (Altabbakh et al, 
2012). An overview of each of the methods is discussed below. 
 
2.1 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis  
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a bottom up inductive (forward 
approach) risk assessment tool that can be used to identify failure modes that would 
negatively impact the overall system. FMEA is classified as a DD-HAT type of hazard 
analysis. It evaluates the effect of these potential failure modes to determine if changes 
are necessary at any stage of the system to overcome such adverse events (Ericson, 
2005). It is very advantageous to apply FMEA at early stages of the system to increase 
safety since changes, if suggested by FMEA, can be with minimal cost (Dhillon, 1999).  
On the other hand, FMEA emphasizes on single failure in isolation and it is not 
geared toward multiple failures in combination although some hazards arise from other 
multiple hazards or events and not necessarily mechanical or electrical failure modes 
(Ericson, 2005). Another drawback is that FMEA does not account for failures that occur 
due to human error in complex systems (Foster, et al., 1999). In addition, FMEA is 




2.2 Fault Tree Analysis  
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a top down deductive (backward approach) risk 
assessment tool that determines failures and contributing factors of adverse events in a 
system. FTA is classified as a DS-HAT and DD-HAT hazards analysis type. Fault trees 
employ graphical diagrams and logic gates to represent the relationship between failures 
and other events in the system and its primary objective is to identify the causal factors of 
a hazard in the system. Fault trees are based on root cause analysis and they depict the 
cause effect relationships between the root cause events visually (Ericson, 2005).  In spite 
of the fact that fault trees requires that analysts study systems under investigation 
thoroughly to eliminate overlooking potential risks factors (Dhillon, 1999), it still lacks 
the ability to capture human error due to the complexity of human behavior that will 
complicate the analysis (Kirwan & Ainsworth, 1992). In addition, due to its lengthy 
details nature, fault trees consume time and accumulate size, which makes it hard to form 
into reliability reports.  
 
2.3 Event Tree Analysis  
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) is a bottom up inductive risk analysis technique that 
identifies and evaluates potential accident and its possible related chain of events 
(Ericson, 2005; Khan & Abbasi, 1998). ETA is classified as a SD-HAT type of hazard 
analysis. The analysis starts with an initiating event and goes further in evaluating every 
possible outcome that can results accordingly. Safety constraints are evaluated in each 
path (accident scenario) whether they are enforced adequately or needs to be addressed in 
order for the selected path to execute smoothly without a failure or an accident. Event 
trees are easy to learn and apply and they combine human, machine, environment, and 
human interaction (Ericson, 2005). Unfortunately, event trees only allow one initiating 
event at one time. Multiple initiating events will have different trees, which will be time 




2.4 Hazard and Operability Analysis  
HAZard and OPerability analysis (HAZOP) is a technique that is used to identify 
hazards in a system to prevent adverse events. (Kletz, 1999). It is classified as a PD-HAT 
and the DD-HAT hazard analysis type. It starts with a brainstorming session where 
concerned people in an organization will use their imagination to determine all possible 
scenarios where hazards or failure might occur, in a systematic way (Kletz, 1999). 
HAZOP is useful to apply to systems that involve human performance and behavior or 
any system that involve hazards that are hard to quantify or detect. On the other hand, 
HAZOP does not take into account the cognitive ability of human as of why they would 
commit an unsafe act, which is a weakness point of HAZOP. Thus, HAZOP analysis is 
not standardized worldwide, hence, the analysis is performed differently with variation in 
results for the same system (Pérez-Marín & Rodríguez-Toral, 2013). Moreover, HAZOP 
study does not take into account the interaction between different component in a system 
or a process (Product Quality Research Institute, 2013), and it also can be lengthy, time 
consuming and expensive (Redmill, 2002).  
 
3. System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes - Introduction  
System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) is a new 
comprehensive accident causation model created by Dr. Nancy Leveson to analyze 
accidents in systems (Leveson, A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems, 
2004). Leveson suggested that with the evolving changes in technology since WWII and 
the emerging massive complexity of systems components a new approach is needed to 
overcome such pitfalls of traditional accident models. Rapid speed of technology 
revolution and digitalized systems, introduced new types of accidents and hazards. 
Accordingly the human system integration relationship is becoming more complex. 
 System analysis is useful when analyzing complex accident involving software, 
organization hierarchical and management, human limitations including decision-making 
and cognitive complexity. Traditional accident causation models lack the ability to 
investigate such complex systems. Not only can STAMP be used to analyze existent 
accidents, but also it can be utilized to design for a safer system during the system 
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development stage to prevent accidents (Leveson, 2003). STAMP views systems as 
dynamic processes with continuous changes with respect to product/process design, 
management, technologies, workforce and such. At the design stage, STAMP emphasizes 
enforcing not only safety constraints to the existent design, but also for future change and 
adaptation such as change of technologies, nature of accidents, type and nature of 
hazards, complexity of human system interaction, and safety regulations (Leveson, 2004). 
Most conventional accident causation models view an accident as a result of a 
series of events adapted from the Domino Theory (Hollnagel, 2004), where one event 
leads to the next. Using this approach, efforts are made by investigators to identify the 
first adverse event in the chain and prevent it from happening without considering 
environmental, organizational, or human contributions. FMEA, FTA, ETA, and Cause- 
Consequence Analysis are based on this approach (Leveson, 1995). They do not work 
well for complex system involving human behavior because they are based on linear 
chain of events and assume accident is a result of a component failure not accounting for 
accident happening where all components are compromised without failure (Hollnagel, 
2004). A common drawback of these conventional chain based accident models is that 
once the root cause was identified, the blame tends to be assigned (often to the operator) 
and the analysis stops (Leveson, 2004).  
The three main principles of STAMP are safety constraints, hierarchical control 
structure, and process models (Leveson, 2012). First, safety constraints are enforced 
through safety controls, which if adequately implemented will prevent adverse events 
from happening. An example of safety constraints in the Space Shuttle Challenger would 
be that the temperature should be greater than or equal to 53 degrees in order for the 
shuttle to launch (Kerzner, 2009). Second, hierarchical control structure represent an 
essential step in applying STAMP where each level of the system contributes to the 
safety or to accidents in a system. Each level of the hierarchy enforce safety constraints to 
the level below it, and each level below have to give feedback on how these constraint 
are successfully implemented or ineffectively failed. Consequently, higher levels of 
hierarchy are responsible of the performance of the lower levels through enforcing safety 
constraints. Missing constraints, inadequate safety control command, commands not 
executed properly at lower level, or inadequate feed back communications about 
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constraints are the main reasons of inadequate controls. Third, four conditions must exist 
for a process to be controlled under STAMP model (Leveson, 2012). Goal (enforcing 
safety constraints in each level of the hierarchy structure by controllers), Action 
Condition (implement actions downward the hierarchy structure), Observatory condition 
(Upward the hierarch), and model condition (the controller’s model of the process being 
controlled), which in our case is the process model. Essentially, without the latter one, a 
process would not adequately be controlled.  
Unlike traditional accident causation models where the root cause consist of an 
event or chain of events, STAMP focus on investigating the cause of an accident by 
identifying the safety control that were inadequately enforced, or sometimes not enforced 
at all (Leveson, 2012). Accidents therefore are considered as a result of interactions 
among system components and the lack of control of safety related constraints, no blame 
is pointed to a single component nor blame pointed towards and individual human 
(Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais, 2003). For example, in the Space Shuttle Challenger 
Disaster, the main cause for the accident was the faulty of the solid rocket booster (SRB) 
o-ring seal. However, applying system approach risk assessment models revealed more 
contributing factors such as decision makers, line managements, politics, safety 
environment, and ineffective communication (Altabbakh, Murray, Damle, & Grantham, 
2012). Furthermore, STAMP would continue the analysis with questions such as, why 
did the o-ring fail to adequately control the released propellant gas? In STAMP, accidents 
are not viewed as failures; instead they represent violation of safety constraints.  
They can occur when existing safety controls are missing or ineffective. Thus the 
safety of a system is considered a control problem, a control of the safety constraint. Dr. 
Leveson explains, “Accidents occur when external disturbances, component failures, or 
dysfunctional interactions among system components are not adequately handled by the 
control system (Leveson, 2004).”  
 
3.1 STAMP Analysis  
Unlike conventional accident causation models, STAMP is not based on chain of 
events. It is based on system theory where each level or the organization plays a major 
role in contributing to an accident or attaining successful system safety controls. Thus 
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STAMP prevails conventional accident models by accounting for organizational factors, 
human error, and adaptation to change over time. In STAMP, system safety is not 
achieved by preventing component failure measures; in fact, it is achieved by enforcing 
safety constraints continuously (Leveson, 2004). Therefore, accidents do not occur 
because of failure of components, they occur because of ineffective safety constraint 
where main focus is not on how to prevent failure, but on how to design better safety 
controls.  
STAMP has been utilized to analyze multiple post accidents (Leveson, 2002) 
(Leveson & Laracy, 2007). Studies showed that utilizing STAMP to analyze accidents 
have revealed more hazards and potential failures in systems than other traditional hazard 
analysis or accident causation models (Song, 2012). Figure 1 depicts the taxonomy of 
contributory factors in accidents by investigative each component of a control loop and 
identifying how each component’s, if improperly operated, can add to the inadequacy of 

























Causal factors have been divided into three main categories. The controller 
operation, the behavior of actuators and controlled processes, and communication and 
coordination among controllers and decision makers. Figure 2 shows the general 
classification of the flaws in the components of the system development and system 
operations control loops during design, development, manufacturing, and operations 
(Leveson, 2004). This classification can be applied to all levels of the organization under 
investigation during accident analysis or as an accident prevention to prevent future or 
potential adverse events.  
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1. Inadequate enforcements of constraints (control actions)  
1.1. Unidentified hazards 
1.2. Inappropriate, ineffective or missing control actions for identified hazards 
1.2.1. Design of control algorithm (process) does not enforce constraints 
—Flaws in creation process 
—Process changes without appropriate change in control algorithm (asynchronous 
evolution) —Incorrect modification or adaptation. 
1.2.2. Process models inconsistent, incomplete or incorrect (lack of linkup) 
—Flaws in creation process 
—Flaws in updating process (asynchronous evolution) 
—Time lags and measurement inaccuracies not accounted for 
1.2.3. Inadequate coordination among controllers and decision makers 
2. Inadequate execution of control action 
2.1. Communication flaw 
2.2. Inadequate actuator operation 
2.3. Time lag 
3. Inadequate or missing feedback 
3.1. Not provided in system design 
3.2. Communication flow 
3.3. Time lag 
3.4. Inadequate sensor operation (incorrect or no information provided  





For each level of the hierarchy, the three main categories should be investigated 
and determine their contribution to the accident (Leveson, 2004):  
 Control actions: inadequate handling of control actions by controllers 
 Execution of control action: inadequate execution of action 
 Feedback: missing or inadequate feedback and communication 
Another category can be added if humans are involved in the organization being 
investigated, which is the context in which the decision has been made and influenced the 
behavior mechanism (Leveson, 2004). Figure 3 is an example the structure of STAMP 







Figure 3: Accident Causal Factor of Provincial Governments - the Walkerton Water 





4. Applying STAMP to an accident in the Oil and Gas Industry  
XYZ is a major oil company that handles crude oil production operations. Two 
separate crude oil processing facilities, (A) and (B), collect the crude oil from a 
constellation of near-by wells. The oil is processed to meet market physical 
characteristics and chemical composition prior to sending it to storage tanks within the 
facility premises. Industrial export pumps are used to send crude oil via a joint a 30” 
diameter pipeline to central storage tank farm stationed near-by export harbors and then 
shipped to potential customers. Figure 4 illustrated the layout of the two facilities.  
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During normal operation, and at approximately 9:30 PM, a major accident 
occurred that created massive damage due to explosion at crude oil processing facility B.  
The accident resulted in fatalities and caused millions of dollars in site damages 
as well as production suspension. The cause of the accident was due to an oil leak from a 
ruptured export pipeline. A spark ignited the pool of leaking crude oil, illustrated in 
figure 5, and resulted in series of massive explosion that destructed the entire facility. In 
addition, the accident resulted in the death of two facility operators and severe injuries to 
















4.1 The Accident  
At 3:40 PM, An electrical malfunction occurred in facility (A) resulted in a 
temporary suspension of export operations. This led to a pressure drop in the joint crude 
oil export pipeline. Operators in facility (A) informed area supervisor as well as operators 
in facility (B) to take proper actions in maintaining the pressure until the malfunction is 
rectified. Operators in facility (B) partially closed the control flow valve to maintain, and 
build up, the operating pressure in the joint export pipeline. In parallel, the maintenance 
crew in facility (A) managed to restore the electrical and resume production operations; 
hence, increase the pressure in the joint export crude oil pipeline.  
Simultaneously, the operators in facility (B) started opening the control flow 
valve back to the original position prior to the shutdown of facility (A). This task is to 
assist in reducing both the backpressure and the built-up pressure resulting from resuming 
production operations in facility (A). Unfortunately, the flow control valve did not fully 
open to its original position. As a result, a backflow generated a build-up pressure in the 
30-inch joint crude oil export pipeline.   
At 9:30 PM, an over pressure in the pipeline resulted in a pipeline rupture and 
caused a leak of approximately 18,000 barrel of crude oil for over a period of 2 hours.  
Once acknowledged, the operators in Facility (B) immediately pushed Emergency 
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Shutdown Button.  This is a part of Emergency ShutDown System (ESD) is designed to 
minimize the consequences of escape of hydrocarbons.   This process consists of 
shutdown of equipment, isolate crude oil by containing it storage tanks, and stop 
hydrocarbon flow to assure maintain the safety and integrity of the facility.  
 Unfortunately, the main flow control valve, which is motor operated, failed to 
fully shutdown and secure the pipeline from flowing any crude oil back in to the facility.  
 Hence, the leak continued to flow from the ruptured pipeline.  The operators in 
facility (B) managed to close the main flow control valve manually and were successful 
in stopping the leak.  Yet, the large amount of leaked crude oil was accumulating nearby 
an electrical generating station.  Since crude oil contains volatile organic fumes and 
vapor, and in an effort to prevent any electrical discharge, electrical maintenance 
contractors in facility (B) disconnected the electrical power supplied to the power-sub-
station.   Simultaneously, the mechanical maintenance crew utilized vacuum trucks to 
collect the spilled crude oil.   This resulted in a static electric discharge and caused series 
of explosions.  The explosions resulted in a total demolition of the facility as well as fires 
that lasted more than 16 hours to extinguish.  In terms of casualties, the explosion 
resulted in the death of four facility operators and severe injuries to 20 contractor 
employees who were at the scene 
 
4.2 Proximity of events:  
 At 3:40 PM, An electrical malfunction occurred in facility (A) 
 Operators in facility (B) tried close the flow control valve 
 Electrical power restored in facility (A) 
 Production resumed in Facility (A) 
 Operator in Facility (B) opened flow control valve 
 Flow control valve did not open to its original position 
 Backflow generated a build-up pressure in the 30-inch joint crude oil export 
 pipeline 
 30-inch pipeline rupture 
 18,000 barrel of crude oil leak 
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 Operator in Facility (B) pushed emergency shutdown button 
 Suspend all ongoing operations within the facility and close all valves 
 Flow control valve failed to fully shutdown 
 The leak continued to flow from the ruptured pipeline 
 Assistant Operators in facility (B) manually, close the main flow control valve 
 Leak stopped 
 Leaked crude oil was accumulating nearby an electrical generating station 
 Operators in facility (B) disconnected the electrical power supplied to the power 
 station 
 Maintenance crew utilized vacuum trucks to collect the spilled crude oil 
 Static electric discharge and caused series of explosions 
 The explosions resulted in a total demolition of the facility 
 Explosion resulted in the death of two facility operators and severe injuries to 20 
 contractor employees who were at the scene 
4.3 Hierarchical Control Structure 
Each hierarchical level of the control structure of company XYZ, as depicted in 
figure 6, will be discussed in terms of inadequacy of enforcing safety constraint, 
inadequacy in executing actions, context, and mental flow. Each box represents a 












Pipeline Mechanical Integrity  
 Oil and gas industry refer to the recommended practices and standards issued by 
the American Petroleum Institute for their activities (Thomas, Thorp, & Denham, 
1992). The recommended maximum piping inspection interval for crude oil 
pipeline is five years as per the Piping inspection code (API 570). "Smart Pigs", a 
propelling cylinder-shaped electronic devices inserted into the pipeline, are 
utilized to evaluate the metal loss due to corrosion, cracks, and any other anomaly 
in the pipeline (Kishawy & Gabbar, 2010). Since the inspection of pipelines 
requires the suspension of production, hence, loss of generated profit, operations, 
Company XYZ recommended all 30-inch pipelines to undergo routine inspections 
every seven years.  
  
Assistant Facility Operators  
 Assistant facility operators conducted a site visit every 4 hours to collect readings 
from various equipment and pressure gauges as part of their routine task. When 
reaching the main export transfer pump, an assistant facility operator observed 
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ruptured pipeline with a pool crude oil leaking. Immediately, he contacted the 
facility operator via intrinsically safe radio, a standard means of communication 
inside the facility to prevent a spark, to initiate an Emergency ShutDown 
procedure by pushing the ESD located in the control room. This is an emergency 
standard procedure designed to minimize the consequences of escape of 
hydrocarbons in case of an oil leak. Consequently, the rest of the assistant facility 
operators started to manually isolate and secure the remaining manually operated 
valves to avoid flow of crude oil through pipelines since not all valves within the 









Facility (B) Operator  
 The facility (B) operator initiated the emergency shutdown (ESD) procedure and 
pushed the (ESD) button located in the control room as per the radio 
communication with the assistant facility operator. This procedure closes both 
motor and pneumatically operated flow control valves to prevent the flow of 
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hydrocarbons. Accordingly, facility operator contacted the on-call/off-site facility 
(B) supervisor by phone and informed him with the leak as part of the emergency 









Facility (B) Supervisor  
 Facility (B) supervisor contacted the Senior Maintenance engineer by phone and 
updated him with the ongoing leak in the facility (B)  
 Facility (B) supervisor contacted the operations superintendent as he was 









Senior Maintenance Engineer  
 Senior maintenance engineer, who is on-call/off-site, contacted the off-site/on-call 
mechanical, electrical, and instrument engineers by phone to contact the off- 
site/on-call foremen, who perform the onsite activities with the assistance of 
maintenance contractor, to head to the facility and rectify the leak by using 
pipeline clamps. These clamps are temporary leak prevention tools secured 
around a pipeline. 
 Senior maintenance engineer contacted by the phone the maintenance 








Maintenance Engineers:  
 The maintenance engineers contacted their off-site/on-call foremen by phone and 
instructed them to deploy the contractor’s mechanical, electrical, and instrument 








 The maintenance foremen (mechanical, electrical, and instrument) contacted the 
off-site/on-call maintenance contractor crew to head to facility (B) which took 
them approximately an hour and a half to reach the facility. 
 Mechanical maintenance crew was successful to stop the leak by clamping the 
ruptured pipeline and using a vacuum tank to gather the leaked crude oil. 
 Electrical/instrument maintenance crew tried isolating the electrical power from 








Operations and Maintenance Manager  
 The manager of production operations and maintenance contacted by phone both 
the emergency response and firefighting team to deploy to facility (B) and assure 
that all leak stopping activities are performed safely. The power generation 
company is also contacted by the operations and maintenance manager to be 
ready to disconnect the power once requested since power to the facility is 
supplied by the power-generation-company. In compliance with the emergency 
response procedures, both the team and power generation company were updated 
with the crude oil leak at facility (B). 
 The executive managing director was contacted by phone and updated with the 





5. Recommendation  
The oil industry utilizes HAZOP risk analysis in its design stages to recognize the 
hazard and operability problems in order to minimize the likelihood and consequences of 
an incident in the facilities (Flin, Mearns, Fleming, & Gordon, 1996). However, Root- 
Cause analysis is considered a fundamental tool to identify causes of accidents within the 
oil industry (Vinnem, Hestad, Kvaløy, & Skogdalen, 2010) as investigators utilized it in 
the case of facility (B) explosion. This method identified the causes of explosion as 
improper human performance that initiated a spark and ignited the pool of leak. In 
addition, the method went into further details in recognizing the cause of the leak was due 
to a ruptured 30 inch export pipeline. Yet, Root-Cause analysis failed to identify any 
procedural and hierarchical gaps negatively influenced decision-making and work 
performance.  
STAMP analysis revealed several delinquencies in different aspects in Company 
XYZ which if identified in proper time; it would have prevented this catastrophe from 
occurring. Different levels of the organizational hierarchy contributed to the accident, 
where the main cause of the accident was the spark. Ineffective safety policy, inadequate 
communication between and within departments, poor supervision, and improper 
allocation of resources are some of the factors that contributed in this tragic accident. 
Policies and regulations must be implemented in Company XYZ to ensure safety to 
human, equipment, and environment.  
If the following scenario has been followed, four lives could have been saved and 
financial losses in terms lost production, facility reconstruction, workers compensation, 
environmental impact, and legal claims/fines could have been avoided. In case of an oil 
leak, the assistant facility operators must ensure that all valves are isolated and securely 
shut to prevent the flow of any hydrocarbons through the pipelines. Thus, gas monitors 
should available with the assistant facility operators to assure that the threshold level of 
evaporating hydrocarbon fumes are within recommended safety limit. Consequently, 
contact the facility operator to proceed with the emergency shutdown processes to isolate 
all motor and pneumatically operated valves. The facility operator, after evaluating the 
situation and assuring that all valves are isolated and the facility is safe to perform any 
maintenance activity, will contact the facility operations supervisor with details of the  
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emergency situation and the emergency procedures that were followed while 
emphasizing that the facility is safe for maintenance staff to proceed with their activity. 
 Concurrently, the facility operator will contact the emergency response and 
firefighting team with details of the situation for them to deploy their equipment and staff 
to supervise the work to be performed by the maintenance staff. The facility operator will 
contact maintenance engineers (mechanical, electrical, and instrument) who are on- site 
as shift-working-type-base and provide details of the emergency situation as they, along 
with the maintenance foremen and maintenance contractors, await for the emergency 
response and firefighting team to ensure the safety of the workplace and give them 
clearance to proceed with the rectification activities. Meanwhile, the power generation 
company will be notified by the electrical maintenance engineer to be ready for 
emergency power shutdown when instructed. This procedure will cut the power supply 
for the facility’s power-sub-station. Both the facility operator and maintenance engineer 
will update both facility operations supervisor and senior maintenance engineer, 
respectively. Hence, both the facility operations supervisor and the senior maintenance 
engineer will inform both the production operations superintendent and the maintenance 
superintendent who will be in touch with the operations and maintenance manager with 
status update as they assure that all safety procedures are emphasized and followed to 
prevent undesired accidents. 
All effort from different levels of the hierarchy must collaborate to design a safer 
system in the company. Policies and procedures should be revised, new regulations must 
be established, implemented to assure that the previous scenario be active and 
understood. Finally, procedures and policy should be designed to accommodate the 
complexity of the human mind, machine components, software, environment, and the 
interaction among them. 
 
6. Conclusion  
STAMP goes beyond the conventional accident causation methods by pinpointing 
the reasons at human performance and component failure and takes it to another level of 
investigation. STAMP goes beyond acknowledging these factors and adds organizational 
hierarchy, working practices, and the roles and responsibility of each staff member in the 
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organization. STAMP was simple to apply in the oil industry case study above without 
the need for special analytical skills or expertise, which can be a value added to the 
analysis, to identify the safety violations resulted in the catastrophe. However, for 
STAMP to be successful, it is essential for the user to have access to some essential 
information. The organization’s hierarchy can assist in identifying their contribution to 
the safety constraint violation in terms of their influence to their subordinates. Policies, 
standards, and regulations that shape work practices and how activities are performed is 
key information in detecting improper task execution. The roles and responsibilities of 
each staff members identify the flow of communication channels used and how decisions 
made and conveyed to the lower hierarchy. Having this information will build a body of 
knowledge enabling the user to recognize limitations in each safety constraint level and 
where they have been violated in each hierarchical level.  
STAMP identifies the violations against the existence safety constraints at each 
level of the control structure and investigates why these controls have not been 
adequately enforced or if they were adequately designed originally.. The method 
outperforms other accident causation models by considering all levels of complex 
systems including environment, human error, physical component failure, the context in 
which the accident happen, and the interrelationship between components, machine, 
human and other components of the system. The model is easy to apply in accident 
investigation and it provides a clear guidance for investigators to conduct the analysis.  
STAMP has proven that it can be applied to different environment such as 
aerospace systems (Leveson, 2004), U.S. Army friendly fire shootings (Leveson, Allen, 
& Storey, 2002), water contamination accident (Leveson, Daouk, Dulac, & Marais, 
2003), aviation (Nelson, 2008) (Hickey, 2012), financial crises (Spencer, 2012), and 
medical industry (Balgos, 2012). STAMP is a useful holistic model to apply in complex 
system. Hickey states, compared to other accident causation models, STAMP will reveal 
more causal factors contributing to accidents (Hickey, 2012).  
Traditional accident analyses are more focused on sequence of events leading to a 
root cause. Once that root is identified all effort will be applied to eliminate it, which 
does not necessarily eliminate other causes from arising. STAMP in contrast is more 
focused on enforcing safety constraints behavior in systems rather than preventing 
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failures. Accidents are viewed as a result of inadequate safety control. Moreover, 
STAMP assist in recognizing scenarios, inadequate controls, the dysfunctional 
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Abstract 
The complexity of the processes and the nature of volatile petroleum products 
urged the oil and gas industry to utilize various risk assessment techniques to identify 
potential failure modes that can interrupt operation processes. Consequently, government 
agencies and nonprofit professional societies guide the industry with regulatory 
guidelines, standards, and best recommended practices to oversee the operations 
management, assure safe working environment, and contain failures within tolerable 
limits. Yet, accidents due to electro-mechanical failures still occur and result in various 
consequences. Accordingly, critics have raised concerns about the petroleum industry's 
safety and risk mitigation credentials and question its ability to prevent future major 
accidents. Therefore, new risk assessment tools need to be introduced to provide decision 
makers and novice engineers with a diverse perception of potential risks. The aim of this 
paper is verify the application of Risk in Early Design (RED), a product risk assessment 
tool, in identifying potential failures in the oil and gas industry. Approximately thirty 
major accident underwent the RED analysis to verify the software's application to 
identify and rank potential failure modes 
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The complexity of the processes and the nature of volatile petroleum products 
urged the oil and gas industry to utilize various risk assessment techniques to identify 
potential failure modes that can interrupt operation processes.  Consequently, government 
agencies and nonprofit professional societies guide the industry with regulatory 
guidelines, standards, and best recommended practices to oversee the operations 
management, assure safe working environment, and contain failures within tolerable 
limits.  Yet, accidents due to electro-mechanical failures still occur and result in various 
consequences.  Accordingly, critics have raised concerns about the petroleum industry’s 
safety and risk mitigation credentials and question its ability to prevent future major 
accidents.  Therefore, new risk assessment tools need to be introduced to provide 
decision makers and novice engineers with a diverse perception of potential risks.  The 
aim of this paper is verify the application of Risk in Early Design (RED), a product risk 
assessment tool, in identifying potential failures in the oil and gas industry.  
 
2. Impact of major accidents in the petroleum industry 
The oil and gas industry has been criticized for accidents that resulted in 
catastrophes on different scales.  The following lists some of these accidents; Deepwater 
Horizon drilling rig explosion and major oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, Piper-alpha rig 
explosion in the North Sea, Kuwait’s Mina al-Ahmadi refinery explosion, and 
Venezuela’s Amuay refinery explosion (Anderson & LaBelle, 1994; Davies, 2010).  The 
result of these accidents negatively impacted the oil and gas industry as well as the 
surrounding communities on different aspects.   
Environmentally, the pollutants spread due to oil or its refined products 
contaminate both land and marine ecosystem (The Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation, 2013). The environmental damage includes underwater 
soils and reefs that are natural habitat to marine life (Ronza, Lázaro-Touza, Caro, & 
Joaquim, 2009). Containing oil spill accidents requires the usage of chemical dispersant 
agent.  Although they remedy pollution, using the chemicals causes toxicity regardless of 
their capability diluting the concentrated crude oil (Etkin, 1999). 
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Health has been impacted by major accidents in the oil and gas industry.  The 
Bhopal gas leak disaster in 1984 killed more than 3800 in first few days of the accident as 
a result of inhaling methyl-isocyanate (MIC) gas (Sharma, 2002).  Moreover, an estimate 
of “15,000 to 20,000 premature deaths reportedly occurring in the subsequent two 
decades” following the accident as “the Indian government reported that more than half a 
million people were exposed to the gas” (Broughton, 2005).  The eight hundred burning 
oil wells in Kuwait due to sabotage during desert storm war resulted in an increase in 
lung cancer, reparatory, and skin diseases (Seacor, 1994).   The piper alpha tragedy 
claimed one hundred sixty seven lives due to a gas leak that resulted in an explosion; 
families and relatives of the lost crew member were psychologically impacted due to the 
loss of their loved ones (Kirchsteiger, 1999). 
There are different financial losses due to an accident; operational profit and 
compensation and legal penalties are types financial impacts.  Accidents can suspend the 
flow of operations causing a loss of production and downtime losses.  Hence, postponing 
production operation results in decline in the company’s marginal profit (Cohen, 1993).  
The tourism industry in the Gulf coast generates an average of $34 billion in revenues; 
the Deepwater Horizon oil spill resulted in contaminating the Gulf shores and resulted in 
a significant loss of $11 billion due to tourists avoiding those areas.   In addition, Gulf 
shore business owners such as real estate, recreation, and fisheries, filed civil lawsuits, 
which BP could face $20 billion in legal penalties, to compensate for their losses (Perry, 
2011).   
Government agencies and nonprofit professional societies guide the industry with 
regulatory guidelines, standards, and best recommended practices to oversee the 
operations management, assure safe working environment, and contain failures within 
tolerable limits.   Thus, The oil and gas industry utilizes different risk assessment tools to 
mitigation potential failures within tolerable limits. 
 
3. Common Risk Assessment tools in the petroleum industry 
The petroleum industry utilizes different risk mitigation methods to contain 
operational failures.  These strategies aim to mitigate potential electromechanical failures 
that can interrupt operations within its facilities.  For example, Failure Mode and Effect 
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Analysis (FMEA) examines the effect of potential failure modes to classify necessary 
phase alterations of the system to overcome failures (Stamatis, 2003; Altabbakh et al., 
2013). 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) surveys failures and contributing factors of breakdown 
in a system by applying diagrams and logic gates to indicate the relationship between 
failures and other events in the system (Hauptmanns, 2004; Altabbakh et al., 2013).  This 
method identifies the probability for base event to occur; the corresponding event tree 
shows possible sequence of the triggered event (Zolotukhin & Gudmestad, 2002). 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) classifies and evaluates possible accident along with 
chain of events (Altabbakh et al., 2013).  The method starts with an instigating event and 
continues to evaluate corresponding possible outcomes (Khan & Abbasi, 1998).  ETA is 
a bottom up method where it starts with a triggered failure and progresses with the 
following consequences; it is considered as both qualitative and quantitative risk 
assessment technique (Mannan, 2004).   
Bow-Tie Analysis demonstrates the causes of accidental events, potential 
consequence, and strategic actions to mitigate hazards.  Saud et al. (2013) consider it as a 
easy to understand and apply method due to its graphical representation.  Yet, the method 
mandates expertise in the operating system and its safety components, difficult to relate it 
to quantitative risk assessment tools, and sophisticated to model inter-related risk controls 
(Lewis & Smith, 2010). 
What–If Analysis “is a structured brainstorming method of determining what 
things can go wrong and judging the likelihood and severity of those situations 
occurring” (University of Arizona Risk Management Services).  The valuation is a 
brainstorming session and based on expertise, nevertheless, unidentified hazards are 
difficult to recognize in the process.  Therefore, the hazard remains unrecognized (Nolan, 
2011; Khan & Abbasi, 1998). 
Hazard and Operability analysis (HAZOP) identifies hazards in a system to 
prevent malfunctions by brainstorming session where specialists utilize different 
hazardous scenarios that might affect the process system (Kletz, 2001).  HAZOP risk 
analysis is expressively applied in the design stages to recognize potential hazards prior 
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to construction. This method is advantageous to reduce both the likelihood and 
consequences of any failure (Flin, Mearns, Fleming, & Gordon, 1996) 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is another widely used risk assessment tool 
in the process industry (Young & Crowe, 2006).  The method evaluates the competence 
of protection layers used to mitigate risk (Summers, 2003). LOPA is a process hazard 
analysis (PHA) tool where it utilizes the hazardous events, event severity, initiating 
causes, and initiating event likelihood database established during the hazard and 
operability analysis (HAZOP).  
Consequently, and based on the analysis of the mitigation methodologies, the 
petroleum industry utilizes different strategies to contain failure modes within tolerable 
limits.  Hence, these strategies assure the operations’ process safety without jeopardizing 
the integrity of the facility’s equipment.  Asset integrity management (AIM) which is an 
inclusive maintenance and inspection program designed to ensure facility’s reliability, is 
one of common strategies applied in the industry (Rezae & Abbas, 2013; Milazzo et. al, 
2010).  Risk based inspection (RBI) follows the footsteps of API RP 580/581 and it is 
corner stone of AIM programs.  RBI is the practice of establishing an inspection action 
plan based on knowledge of the risk of failure of the equipment (API RP, 2009).  It 
combines an assessment of the probability, or the likelihood of failure due to degradation 
or deterioration with an assessment of the potential resulting consequences due to the 
corresponding failure.  Hence, Risk Based Inspection recognizes, evaluates and charts 
potential risks that can impact equipment’s’ mechanical integrity (API RP, 2009; 
Milazzo, Maschio, & Uguccioni., 2010).  The gathered information assist in identifying 
the both the type and the rate of the potential failure that might harm the corresponding 
operating equipment.   The program is essential to monitor the equipment’s degradation 
due to operating and environmental conditions as it forecasts and recommends corrective 
measures (Marley, Jahre-Nilsen, & BjØrnØ, 2001).   
These thorough methods, to name several, evaluate potential risks and try to 
sustain them within tolerable limits (Flin, et. al, 1996; Vinnem et al., 2010; Yasseri & 
Mahani, 2013).  Yet, with stringent techniques and risk mitigation tools utilized in the 
petroleum industry, major accidents occur with catastrophic consequences affecting the 
environment, society and oil and gas industry’s stakeholders.  These accidents, and many 
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others, are wake up calls to the petroleum industry to explore new tools to avoid similar 
accidents from occurring (Mihailidou, Antoniadis, & Assael, 2012).   
 
4. Risk in Early Design (RED) 
Having an early and precise risk assessment is essential to forecast and mitigate 
potential accidents from taking place, especially at the conceptual design stages (M.F. 
Milazzo, 2013; Lough et. al, 2009). The team developed Risk in Early Design (RED) 
theory to generate a list of possible product risks.  The software allows users with limited 
experience to predict both when and where a product may fail by simply knowing the 
function of their product.  The product risks are based on historical data of product input 
function and rank them by their occurrence likelihood and consequence (Lough et. al, 
2008). Functioning as both as failure mode identification and risk ranking tool, Risk in 
Early Design (RED) is custom software that allows users to leverage failures from other 
products to help predict what may go wrong with the user's product.  RED promotes 
failure prevention by identifying failure risks as early as the conceptual design phase, 
where impacts of failure prevention are furthermost. It does this by using subject specific 
knowledge-bases populated by historical failure events in a variety of categories such as 
product failures, software failures, and business failures.  The user simply selects the 
functions of the item that is undergoing a risk assessment and the type of assessment 
desired. The information quickly communicated by the RED software is the function (i.e. 
potential failure location), failure mode, risk likelihood, and risk consequence via 
mathematical mapping processes (Grantham Lough, Stone, & Tumer, 2005). It also 
categorizes the output into high, medium, and low risk areas.  
To demonstrate the process, and via Missouri S&T intranet , the user selects the 
corresponding matrix/Knowledgebase whether it is on System Level; compare this 
product against all the other products in the database or Subsystem Level; looks at the 
product itself to determine “potentially risky parts” for which reliability need be 










Accordingly, the user selects multiple functions that pertain to the corresponding 









Once selected, the software will generate preliminary results in risk matrix chart 
with list of selected functions.  This graphical color-coded depiction of the risk elements 
divides them into three categories – low (green), medium (yellow), and high (red), 
respectively.  This is essential graphical illustration to aid in the understanding of what 
risk elements demand the most attention from engineers and designers (Lough et. al, 
2008).  Accordingly, RED analysis provides the total number of risks where each risk 
type has a link for a tale of the details of the selected risk matrix.   The matrix indicates 
the link  between function and risk in early design by presenting a mathematical mapping 
from product function to risk assessments. Accordingly, the knowledge base for RED is 
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“stored and manipulated in three types of matrices” containing function-component 
matrix and component-failure matrix, respectively (Mitchell et al., 2005, p. 723) where 
their product results in function-failure matrix as illustrated in Figure 3. RED utilizes 
populated database from historical failure, as well as potential product failure modes that 












RED applies simple mathematics to communicate archived historical product 
specific risks in both hierarchical integer and color-coded format.  The matrix is linked to 
data base of potential failure modes that can interrupt operation (Lough, Stone, & Tumer, 
2008; Grantham Lough, Stone, & Tumer, 2005).  Figure 4 illustrates the generated 











The user can explore further specific information about the product’s risks and 
consequences.  This will generate comprehensive report, via an excel sheet, that will 
include the potential failure, likelihood and consequence.  The availability of this 
information enables the user to separate data into columns and rows and allows to sort by 
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their various levels of risk for simplicity and ease of use.  The table will provide the user 
with risk level, component functions, potential failure modes, likelihood and 
consequence.  Figure 5 illustrates the corresponding details list for the matrix for 
likelihood 4 and consequence 4, respectively, where five failure modes were identified by 
the software based on the selected component functions.  These failure modes indicate a 




   
 





When compared to other risk assessment tools, RED does not require specialists 
to detect possible failures as it employs a historical knowledgebase to produce the 
potential risks (Grantham Lough, Stone, & Tumer, 2005; Lough, Stone, & Tumer, 2009). 
This feature is advantageous for engineers lacking basic product failure knowledge.  
 
5. RED and the oil industry 
As RED analyzes the risk and consequences of a component in a system, the 
catalogued historical failure database tabulated into the software are intended for generic 
product functions (Lough et al, 2009).  To verify RED’s capability in identifying failure 
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modes, approximately thirty major accidents due to electro-mechanical failures were 
randomly selected to undergo the evaluation.  Hence, the software was not originally 
designed to identify potential failure modes in the oil and gas industry.  The first step in 
performing an accurate RED analysis is selecting the functions performed by components 
in the system.  These functions can be selected from a list of “electromechanical 
functions” cataloged in the RED software tool.  The analysis identifies potential causes of 
failures that could interrupt operations.   
The generated RED analysis signifies failure modes for the selected component.  
In order to verify the results of RED analysis, accident reports issued by either 
government agencies were cross-referenced.  Hence, the reports identify both the 
component location and the cause of the failure.  Four case studies with different causes 
of failure modes are list to demonstrate the capability of the software to identify failure 
modes contributed to the accidents.  
 
5.1 Alexander Kielland Accident 
In 1980, the Norwegian oil drilling rig Alexander Kielland collapsed in Ekofisk 
oil field in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea resulting in 123 fatalities on board of 
the rig (Huse, 2011).  The investigative report concluded that the rig collapsed due to a 
fatigue crack in one of its six bracings due to poor welding (Saini, 2011); figure 6 









To verify, RED was utilized to analyze the functionality of the supporting braces 
and evaluate potential failure modes.  The functions of supporting brace were entered in 









The RED analysis identified several potential failures with different ranks for 
likelihood and consequence.  With likelihood 5 and consequence 5 in the risk matrix, the 
user recognizes three potential failures for the supporting brace; Hydrogen damage, 









Similarly, high cycle fatigue appeared as a potential failure mode in addition to 
other failure modes that can obstruct the systems function.  Table 2 list the potential 












The conducted investigations concluded that one of the lower tubular bracings 
failed due to fatigue, hence, the attached support was torn off resulting in a capsizing the 
platform (Almar-Naess, Haagensen, Lian, Moan, & Simonsen, 1982).  In addition, the 
investigations concluded that the design fatigue life of the bracing was inadequate (Moan, 
2007; Clinton et al, 1981).  Hence, the RED analysis resulted in the same failure mode 
indicated by the investigation report in addition to other potential failure modes that can 
impact the integrity of the brace.  
 
5.2 Enbridge pipeline oil spill 
In 2010, a thirty-inch pipeline transporting crude oil ruptured near Marshall, 
Michigan.  According to EPA, the leak resulted in more than one million gallons of crude 
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that entered Lake Michigan tributary, Kalamazoo River.   The National Transpiration 
Safety Board investigation report concluded that overload fracture, due to an increase 
from 50 psi to 200 psi by the Canadian Enbridge Energy, caused the pipeline to rupture 
(Committee on Transportation and Infrastucture, 2010).  According to Dr. Heiderbach, 
high cycle fatigue is the most common cause of pipeline failure in the oil and gas industry 
(Heidersbach, 2010) 
RED was utilized to analyze the functionality of the pipeline and to evaluate 
potential failure modes.  The functions of pipeline were entered in RED software.  Figure 











The RED analysis identified several potential failures with different ranks for 
likelihood and consequence.  With likelihood 5 and consequence 5 in the risk matrix, the 
user recognizes two potential failures for the pipeline; impact fracture and high cycle 
fatigue, as illustrated by table 3.   
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Similarly, high cycle fatigue appeared as a potential failure mode in addition to 
other failure modes that can obstruct the systems’ function.  Table 4 list the potential 










The results of RED analysis corresponds to the result of the accident report issued 
by the National Transpiration Safety Board investigation report (Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastucture, 2010).  Additional potential failure modes were part of 




5.3 Kuwait’s Mina Al-Ahmadi Accident 
Kuwait’s Mia A-Ahmadi is the largest of three crude oil refinery with a refining 
capacity over 460,000 barrel per day (KNPC, 2014).  The refinery produces Benzene, jet 
fuel, and diesel for both domestic and export markets.  In June 25, 2000, while 
maintenance crew were attempting to control a gas leak from a Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) pipeline at the refinery, an explosion occurred and destroyed the entire facility.  
The explosion killed five workers near-by, more than fifty workers on site were injured 
and financial losses of more than $840 million both from production loss and revamping 












The cause of the gas leak was due to several reasons.  Stress corrosion cracking 
caused the pipeline to burst (Thomson, 2013).  The flutuation in flow of the liqufied 
natural gas due to compressors’ cyclic pumping resulted in high-cycle fatigue’s 
superimposed the corrosion in the pipeline (Blanco & Dobmann, 2013).   In addtion, The  
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existance of Carbon dioxide, Hydrogen Sulfide, and other corrosive substances, 
negatively impacted the overall mechanical integrity of the pipeleine (Thompson, 2013).  
Hece, stress corrosion was another contributing factor to the cause of the accident 
(Thomson, 2013; KNPC, 2014).    
The functionality of the pipeline has been analyzed by RED software.  The result 
of the analysis determines the potential failure modes accordingly.  The functions of 
pipeline were entered in RED software where Figure 10 illustrates the likelihood and 










The RED analysis identified several ranks of potential failures of different 
likelihood consequences, as illustrated in Figure 10.  The software recognized twenty 
three potential failure modes for likelihood five and consequence 5 in the risk matrix, as 
illustrated in table 5.  The list includes high cyclic fatigue as one of the highest failure 











Moreover, both stress corrosion and corrosion fatigue, which were the main cause 
of the gas leak, appeared as a potential failure mode with both likelihood and 
consequence of four and four, respectively.   Hence, RED successfully identified the 
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main causes of the failure, in addition to a long list of potential failure modes that can 
obstruct the systems function and impact the integrity of the component (pipeline).  Table 
6 list the potential failures with likelihood and consequence of four and four, 









5.4 Ula oil field accident 
On September 2012, a significant amount of crude oil leaked on one of Ula’s oil 
field production faculties. The oil field is located at the southern end of the Norwegian 
continent shelf. According to the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA), the 
cause of the accident was due to fracturing of the bolds holding together a valve attached 
to a separation vessel (Lauridsen, 2012). Furthermore, the accident report concluded that 
“Seepage in the valve exposed the bolts to produced water with a high content of 
chlorides and a temperature of about 120°C,” the seepage commenced “chloride stress 
corrosion cracking which weakened the bolts until they finally fractured” (Lauridsen, 
2012, p. 30). Several incidents petroleum fields and installations in the North Sea have 
been related to bolt failures; fatigue, Hydrogen embrittlement, ductile torsional overload, 
and corrosion are among the most common failures encountered (Bøgner, Rørvik, & 
Marken, 2005).  
RED was utilized to analyze the functionality of the bolt and to evaluate potential 





Figure 11. Ula's likelihood and consequences of potential failures 
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The software identified several potential failure modes with different likelihood 
and consequence ranking.  When selecting the likelihood 4 and consequences four, the 
detailed analysis of the software recognized both high and low cycle fatigue, as depicted 
in table 7.  Thus, direct chemical attack from corrosive environment was also identified in 











Accidents of different scales urged the oil and gas industry to innovate new risk 
assessment tools to prevent future failure from occurring. Risk in Early Design (RED), a 
product risk assessment tool, was applied to identify different failure modes that might 
interrupt operation in the oil and gas industry. The software successfully identified the 
failure modes in different major accidents, in addition to other potential failure modes 
that can impact the integrity of the selected component. The results of the RED analysis 
were verified by the corresponding accident reports. 
 The software is a supporting tool and compliments other Process Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) tools currently used in the industry. However, RED is advantageous in 
generating a list of prelude risk assessment based on cataloged historical product failure 
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record. The proposed new method aspires in assisting both novice engineers and 
designers lacking the necessary experience. The software provides preliminary risk 
assessments and potential failure mode identification leverage for electromechanical 
products based on archived knowledge of past failures. The archived knowledge used to 
generate the RED risk results is mathematically associated to product function. This 
relationship to product function provides designers the ability to project failures related to 
their product's function as early as the conceptual design stages and identify consequent 
mitigation strategies.  
As an ongoing project, the software compliments another software, Generated 
Risk Event Effect Neutralization (GREEN), which proposes mitigation strategies. These 
strategies can aid the end user to minimize the likelihood and/or consequence of the 
potential failure modes that can negatively impact process operations. Hence, both 
software will be verified by experts in the field of risk assessment and accident causation. 
Accordingly, both RED and GREEN will be validated by petroleum industry's end users. 
The end-user can be, but not limited to, facility design engineer, risk assessment 
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Abstract 
The upstream industry uses diverse risk mitigation approaches to mitigate 
eventual failures within its facilities. Yet, these approaches could not avert major 
accidents, on different scales, from happening as they negatively affect the industry.  The 
purpose of this paper is to assess Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization (GREEN) 
as a new tool to select suitable risk mitigation approach to prevent prospective failures in 
upstream industry.  More than 200 hundred major accidents in the industry underwent 
GREEN evaluation and compared with existing risk mitigation approaches used in to 
mitigate eventual failures.  Kuwait’s’ Mina Al-Ahmadi explosion was chosen as a case 
study to apply GREEN.  The results of GREEN analysis were verified to both upstream 
industry’s standards and best practices, thus an opinion from the design team at Kuwait’s 
Mina Al-Ahmadi to validate the result.   
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The increasing global demand for petroleum is the driving mechanism for the 
petroleum companies to continuously upgrade their facilities and implement the latest 
technological advancements in equipment, computerized software, and synchronized 
human-system interaction (Health and Safety Executives, 2013).  Government agencies 
and professional societies guide the upstream industry with the best practices and 
regulatory guideline, to assure safe working environment and to administer the 
operations’ management (Health and Safety Executives, 2013).  Consequently, the 
industry utilizes a wide range of risk assessment tools to mitigate potential operational 
risks.  Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree 
Analysis (ETA), Bow Tie Analysis, What–If Analysis, Hazard and Operability analysis 
(HAZOP), and Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) are the most widespread tools used 
in the oil and gas industry.  These meticulous tools evaluate potential risks and try to 
sustain them within tolerable limits (Flin, et al., 1996; Vinnem et. al, 2010; Yasseri & 
Mahani, 2013).   
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate Generated Risk Event Effect 
Neutralization (GREEN) as a new tool to aid, both engineers and managers, in choosing 
suitable risk mitigation approach.  GREEN will assist in exploring different mitigation 
approaches and their competences in averting prospective failures in the upstream 
industry.  In order to validate the results of GREEN, more than two hundred major 
accidents were selected and underwent GREEN evaluation.  The origin of the failures 
was electro-mechanical, material failure, and design flaws.  The causes of the accidents 
were validated by accident report.  Thus, GREEN evaluation was associated with existing 
risk mitigation approaches used to contain prospective failures and their consequences. In 
addition, upstream industry’s professionals were consulted to validate both GREEN and 
industry’s risk mitigation approaches and best precise as foundation of rationalization. 
These thorough systems, to name some, assess prospective risks and try to sustain 
them within allowable limits (Flin, et. al, 1996; Vinnem et al., 2010; Yasseri & Mahani, 
2013).  Yet, with rigorous techniques and risk mitigation tools utilized in the upstream 
industry, major accidents occur with catastrophic consequences affecting the 
environment, society and petroleum industry’s stakeholders.  Accordingly, the need 
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assess the conceivable risk mitigation approach is necessary to aid, both engineers and 
decision makers, to choose the optimal risk mitigation strategy. Hence, Generated Risk 
Event Effect Neutralization (GREEN) is an innovative will assist in exploring different 
mitigation approaches and their capabilities in preventing potential failures in the 
upstream industry. 
 
1.1 The Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization method (GREEN) 
The Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization method (GREEN) is a risk 
mitigation approach-selecting tool (Krus & Grantham, 2013).  The method, following 
Risk in Early Design (RED), developed by Dr. Grantham and her team identifies and 
selects the dominating and optimal risk mitigation strategy (Lough, Stone, & Tumer, The 
risk in early design method, 2009).  Hence, GREEN matrices define possible mitigation 
strategies where these matrices include “information on potential failure modes and their 
parameters, parameters that have been changed by mitigation strategies, and the 
likelihood and consequence changes for a given mitigation strategy” (Krus, Grantham, & 
Murray, 2012).   Figure 1. illustrates the overall GREEN process of selecting the optimal 
and dominating risk mitigation strategy to potential failures (FS). The result of the 
functional model and RED analysis are the base for both determining the possible 
mitigation strategies and evaluating the optimal strategy to fit the system, respectively.  
In order to explore the validity of GREEN, the tool will be applied to a case study 
in the upstream industry.  The results of the analysis will be validated with industry 


















2. Applying GREEN in the Upstream Industry 
For GREEN to effective in selecting the optimal risk mitigation strategies, 
cataloged historical failure database imbedded in the Risk in Early Design (RED) 
software are cataloged for the upstream industry.  More than two hundred accident 
caused by electro-mechanical failures in the industry underwent GREEN evaluation to 
identify both failure modes and corresponding optimum risk reduction and mitigation 
strategies.  The process is a series of steps that links the mitigation strategies with failure 
modes, compares the potential strategies, and chooses the optimal strategies.   An 
accident due to electro-mechanical failure from the upstream industry was selected to 
validate the consistency of GREEN analysis.  The method utilizes the analysis of Risk in 
Early Design (RED) software and indicates the optimal mitigation strategy accordingly. 
The first step in performing an accurate RED analysis is selecting the functions 
performed by components of the system.  These functions can be selected from a list of 
“electromechanical functions” cataloged in the RED software tool.  Consequently, 





2.1 Kuwait’s Mina Al-Ahmadi Accident 
Kuwait’s Mia A-Ahmadi is the largest of three crude oil refinery with a refining 
capacity over 460,000 barrel per day (KNPC, 2014).  The refinery produces Benzene, jet 
fuel, and diesel for both domestic and export markets.  In June 25, 2000, while 
maintenance crew were attempting to control a gas leak from a Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) pipeline at the refinery, an explosion occurred and destroyed the entire facility as 
illustrated by figure 2.  The explosion killed five workers near-by, more than fifty 
workers on site were injured and financial losses of more than $840 million; both from 
production loss and revamping the facility (KNPC, 2014).  The cause of the gas leak was 
due to several reasons; stress corrosion cracking caused the pipeline to burst (Lough, 
Stone, & Tumer, 2009; Thomson, 2013).  The flutuation in flow of the liqufied natural 
gas due to compressors’ cyclic pumping resulted in high-cycle fatigue’s superimposed 
the corrosion in the pipeline (Blanco & Dobmann, 2013).   In addtion, stress corrosion, 
the result of the sour nature of the natural gas due to the existence of Carbon dioxide, 
Hydrogen Sulfide, and other corrosive substances, negatively impacted the overall 





















In order to Apply GREEN for the optimal risk mitigation approach, the 
functionality of the pipeline has been analyzed by RED software.  As a result, and 
utilizing GREEN Matrices (Krus, Grantham, & Murray, 2012), the potential mitigation 
stratigies were determined for this case study.  The results of GREEN anayslsis identified 
20 mitigation strategies for high cycle fatigue, 23 for corrosion fatigue, and 22 for stress 
carrion, respectively.  Tables 1 illustrates the collection of mitigation strategies presented 
by the FS matrix with the number of occurrences, in addition the likelihood and 





















Change natural frequency 0 5 <5 
Condition Material 1 5 <5 
Condition Part 1 5 <5 
Convert Material 3 4.8 4.8 
Convert Part 1 5 4.9 
Couple Part 0 5 <5 
Decrease Motion 0 5 <5 
Decrease Power Assist 0 5 <5 
Import Lubricant 0 5 <5 
Import Material 0 5 <5 
Import Part 0 5 <5 
Import Stress 0 5 <5 
Increase Control 1 <5 <5 
Increase Flow 0 5 <5 
Remove Part 0 <5 <5 
Secure Part 1 <5 <5 
Separate Contaminant 0 5 <5 
Shape Part 5 5 <5 
Stabilize Process 0 5 <5 






As the upstream industry applies different risk assessment tools to mitigate 
potential failures, accidents on different scales continue to occur as they negatively 
impact the industry.  Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization (GREEN) analysis was 
utilized to examine potential risk mitigation strategies upstream industry.  The analysis 
successfully identified potential failure modes for different major accidents with different 
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causes of failures and the possible strategies to control them.  The analysis was successful 
in capturing the failure modes that caused catastrophes in twenty-six major accidents, in 
addition to potential risk mitigation strategies to prevent similar future accidents.  
GREEN is advantageous in producing a list of prelude risk assessment based on 
cataloged historical product failure record, and their corresponding control strategies.  
The tool can assist novice engineers and decision makers in the upstream industry in 
recognizing potential failure modes in the process system and how to accurately mitigate 
their likelihood and consequence; especially in the design conceptual design stages.   
As a future work, the tool will address the human factor aspect n the industry due 
to its importance with the merging complex technologies.  The close interaction between 
human and machines in a very volatile process environment makes it necessary to 
consider human-system integration and human factors part of the overall system design.  
Hence, this consecration will look into risk from different perspectives resulting in design 
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IV. SAFETY AWARENESS IN UNDERGRADUATE ENGINEERING 
STUDENTS 
Altabbakh, Hanan; AlKazimi, Mohammad A.; Murray, Susan; Grantham, Katie 
 
ABSTRACT 
Accidents among engineering and science students in college workshops and labs 
have resulted in either severe injuries or tragic fatalities. Students with technical majors 
are required to take scientific laboratory courses and they apply their knowledge by 
engaging in various competitive technical design teams.  Such involvement requires them 
to spend time in labs and/or workshops, both of which can be hazardous environments. 
Consequently, college students’ safety mindset can be essential in both in and outside the 
classroom setting. In a few years, and after earning their degrees, these students will put 
their knowledge into practice to be engineers and scientists in the workforce. Their safety 
awareness and attitude towards risk is often being formed in college and will follow them 
into their professional career. In an effort to prevent accidents and improve safety 
cognition in young engineers and scientist, this study examines the training exposure and 
knowledge within technical competition teams from the students’ perspectives. A survey 
targeting different OSHA safety areas was conducted to measure safety training, 
knowledge, and attitude of these undergraduate students. The paper, also, explores 
potential causes of unsafe decision making by the students surveyed. 
 




Young engineering and science students participate in various technical design 
teams and class project teams during their academic years.  Teams at Missouri University 
of Science and Technology such as Formula SAE racecars, ASCE Concrete Canoe, 
robotics competitions, and aircraft designs are few examples of different college design 
teams students can participate in competitions across the nation (Student Design and 
Experiential Learning Center, 2014) .  As part of their preparation for the competitions, 
students spend time in campus workshops where they encounter different types of 
hazardous and flammable materials, machines, and other hazards. Similarly, students 
majoring in either engineering or science majors conduct lab experiments as part of their 
required academic curriculum. Often without adequate safety training, these college 
students are exposed to numerous hazards.  
In the past decade, there have been increased concerns regarding the frequency of 
academic laboratory accidents occurring across the country.  These accidents resulted in 
either severe injuries or even deaths. For example, a graduate student was severely 
injured; lost three fingers, burned both his hands and face, and injured one of his eyes at a 
chemistry lab at Texas Tech University.  The explosion destroyed the entire laboratory 
facility as shown in Figure 1 (U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 
2010). Another accident involved a twenty-three years old year old female student died of 
second and third degree burns over 43% of her body while doing a research experiment 
in a UCLA lab (Christensen, 2009). An unfortunate student died of asphyxiation due to 
neck compression when her hair caught in one of the lathe machines in Yale University’s 
workshop (Henderson, Rosenfeld, & Serna, 2012). Four students from the University of 
Missouri-Columbia were severely injured during a hydrogen explosion in June of 2010 
(U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2010). Two students from the 
University of Maryland were severely injured due to a chemical explosion due to 
improper waste management that resulted in first and second-degree chemical burns, 
respectively ( (The Safety Zone by C&EN, 2014). The accidents reports for the accidents 
cited improper safety procedures; lack of training, improper documentation of training 
sessions, inadequate rectification to unsafe act within lab premises such as not wearing 
personal protective equipment (PPE) (Kemsley, 2009).  These accidents, along with 
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others, raise questions whether college students lack both the minimum safety awareness 





Figure 1. Texas Tech University laboratory explosion U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard 





2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The U.S. workforce employed 19.5 million young workers between the age of 16 
and 24 years old in July 2012. That number was approximately 12% increase compared 
to 21.4 million in April 2011 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). During the period of 
1998-2007, the U.S. recorded 3.6 deaths per 100,000 young workers (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2012). Furthermore, 7.9 million non-fatal injuries in the same age group were 
treated in emergency departments (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010). To 
better understand potential causes of these accidents, a survey was conducted to measure 
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safety training, knowledge, and attitude of college students in engineering and science 
fields at Missouri University of Science and Technology.  
Researchers have indicated that young workers are at more risk than their older 
colleges when it comes to work place injuries (Salminen, 2004; McCabe, 2008; Breslin et 
al., 2008). Other study showed that emerging adults tend to be higher sensation seeking 
(Zuckerman, 1979). Psychologists define higher sensation seeking as pursuing intense 
experiences and the willingness to take different levels of risks to reach that experience 
(Zuckerman, 1994).  Numerous researchers have discussed the variables that account for 
such behavior in emerging adults; these include both cognitive and psychosocial factors 
(Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996).  
Theories have tackled the risk taking behavior in emerging adults and adolescents 
and they fall into three essential categories. First, biological based on hormonal effects, 
asynchronous pubertal timing, or genetic predispositions; second, psychological or 
cognitive deficiencies in self-esteem, cognitive immaturity, or affective disequilibrium; 
the third category is environmental causes that focus on social influence related to family 
and peer interactions, or community and societal norms (DiClemente, Hansen, & Ponton, 
1995).  
Psychologist conducted studies to explore potential causes of unsafe decision 
making within adolescent and college students (Laursen, 2009).  The result of the studies 
showed that  the frontal lobes in the human brain contain all the neurological brain 
“executive functions” in the process of decision making; preparation, evaluating, and 
historical referencing in terms of both long and short term memories (Johnson, Blum, & 
Giedd, 2009)   In a study conducted by neuroscientist to evaluate adolescents brain 
development, especially the frontal lobe, the brain “maturation” requires “opportunities to 
interact in group situations which facilitate concern for others, problem solving, and 
responsible behavior” (Laursen, 2009, p. 8).  As a result, the frontal lobe establishes the 
ability to indicate and weigh potential consequences of any act to be executed, and this 
function is relatively slowly developing compared to adults (Laursen, 2009).  As a result, 
and due to exposure to different social environment, adolescents will achieve intellectual 
control over their behavior (Laursen, 2009).  
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According to the National Research Council (2011), the undergraduate chemistry 
laboratory courses are the first step toward familiarizing students with the basics of safety 
culture.  These instructor are assigned to supervise a group of inexperienced students to 
conduct experiments in the laborites without comprehending minimal “risk management 
techniques that are designed to eliminate various potential dangers in the laboratory” 
(National Research Council, 2011, p. 3).   
In order to ensure the health and safety of its laboratory users, and to avoid 
lawsuit claims for liability and negligence, universities should adhere to federal 
regulatory requirement that is related to laboratory standards.  They include, and not 
limited to, OSHA Hazard Communication Standard (29 CFR 1910.1200), OSHA Lab 
Standard (29 CFR 1910.1450), and the EPA’s Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), which regulates both hazardous waste and air pollutants to protect the working 
environment, (Amherst College, 2014; Hays, 2005).  The campus environmental health 
and safety department are the campus resource for regulatory compliance, hazardous 
waste management, laboratory and radiation safety, and admistring the safety programs.  
American Chemical Society (2012) conducted comparative studies to examine existing 
laboratory safety procedures from different universities.  The result of studies indicated 
that university labs adhere to state laws as well both OSHA and EPA minimum 
requirements to safely perform laboratory experiments.  Hence, these requirements avoid 
liability due to negligent behaviors as they provide suggestive recourses for promoting 
safety practices (Hill, 2012) 
Prior to supervising laboratory experiments, both hired laboratory technicians 
and/or graduate students undergo safety-training sessions.  The purpose of these sessions 
is to familiarize them with the previously stated regulatory compliance and assuring 
adherence to safety guidelines.  The type of training offered to laboratory instructors 
consists of either classroom lectures or online training videos.  The topics 
include interpreting Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS), hazardous waste management 
and chemical waste tags, chemical compatibility and storage, spill response procedures, 
the use of fire safety equipment and personal protective equipments, ensure both 
electrical and machine safety (OSHA, 2014).  Thus, to assure safety and compliance, a 
periodic refresher-training courses are offered periodically to the both lab technicians 
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and/or returning graduate students supervising lab activities (National Research Council, 
2011). 
Once completed, the lab technician and/or the graduate student are eligible to 
supervise undergraduate students conducting curriculum laboratory experiments 
Consequently, the instructors are then assigned to supervise a group of inexperienced 
undergraduate students to conduct experiments in the laborites.  However, and prior to 
the commencement of any lab activities, prospective science or engineering students must 
complete a safety orientation seminar.  This can be done either by attending sessions 
conducted by the lab instructors or video session.  Once successfully completed,  a signed 
form of completion or passing a questionnaire grants the eligibility of the student to 
perform supervised lab tasks.  Unfortunately, the students lacks the comprehension of 
minimal “risk management techniques that are designed to eliminate various potential 
dangers in the laboratory” since the training session do not cover all topics related to lab 
safety (National Research Council, 2011, p. 3)  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
In order to measure safety training, knowledge and attitude of college students at 
Missouri University of Science and Technology, a survey was constructed based on the 
Goal Question Metric (GQM) approach (Basili, Caldiera, & Rombach, 1994).  The 
Survey was with reference to OSHA Guidelines 54 Fed Register #3904-3916 (Basili, 
Caldiera, & Rombach, 1994). The GQM method required a top down methodology in 
constructing the survey (Basili, Caldiera, & Rombach, 1994). First, goals need to be 











Table 1.  The Goal Question Metric Survey Model 
Goals Questions Metrics 
Evaluate the 





Have you been trained to use the personal 
protective equipment (PPE)? 
- “No, never” 
- “Yes, no 
formal 
training” 




Have you been trained on how to 
prepare/understand lockout/tagout? 
Have you been trained on using material safety 
data sheet (MSDS)? 
Have you been trained on machine guarding? 
Have you been trained on evacuation from your 





In which of the following situations are you 
required to wear safety glasses? (Please check 
all that apply) 
- Percentage of 
correct 
response 
Lockout/tagout is required when. (Please check 
all that apply) 
Locks should always stay on the equipment 
during the shift change? True or false 
When working in a workshop/lab, when do you 
use MSDS (please check all the apply) 
Which statement(s) are true about machine 
guarding? 






In situations where safety glasses are required, 
how often do you wear them? 
- Likert scale & 
Open ended 
discussion 
Do you refer to the MSDS whenever a chemical 
or a hazardous material is spilled? 
How often do you check if machine guards re 




Table 1.  The Goal Question Metric Survey Model (cont.) 
-  
In case of an emergency, how often would you 
follow the instructions written for the 
emergency action plan? 
-  
If you feel that PPE is not necessary when 







How safety conscious are you? 







Next, based on these goals, a set of questions is used to measure the information 
needed to accomplish these goals.  Finally, metrics are used to quantify the data answered 
in the questions (Basili, Caldiera, & Rombach, 1994). A questionnaire with 23 items 
together with five demographic questions was used to collect the data. The goal of the 
survey was to determine the amount of training the students have on OSHA procedures, 
evaluate their knowledge, and application, of general safety procedures, their safety 
attitude, and consciousness. Five questions were asked about the amount of training they 
had on personal protective equipment (PPE), lockout/tagout, material safety data sheets, 
machine guarding, and emergency evacuation as recommended by OSHA guidelines 54 
Fed Register #3904-3916. Six questions were asked to test their knowledge on OSHA 
procedures. Five questions were asked to evaluate their attitude toward safety in labs or 





4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A total of 93 web-based questionnaires were distributed, via Missouri S&T email, 
by the workshop supervisor to students participating in the competitive design teams.  
The questionnaires were returned with the following results; 68% of the respondents were 
male, 31% were female, and 1% preferred not to answer. The majority of the 
respondents’ were undergraduate students (32% seniors, 25% juniors, 17% sophomores, 
and 18% freshmen), the others were alumni (3%) and graduate students (3%) with 95% 
of the total students majoring in engineering. 95% of the students were either involved in 
one or more design competition team in the present or past and only 5% were never 
involved in any design team. The students were asked if they undergone any safety 
training during their academic years.  The survey response showed that 97% of the 
students were exposed to some safety training.  OSHA 10 hour training, first aid CPR and 
AED, and high school shop training are example of their exposure to former safety 
training. 
 
4.1 Goal one: Evaluate the amount of safety training of design team student 
                        members 
Students were asked if they had any formal safety training during their academic 
years.  They were given the response options of chemistry laboratory safety training, 
workshop safety training, safety engineering or similar classes offered on campus, and 
any other related form of safety education they might consider a safety course.  When 
analyzing the students’ feedback to the amount of safety training they have received; it 
was found that less than 30% of the respondents had any type of formal training.  Most of 
the respondents were exposed to shop safety training, which is limited to certain types of 
equipment within the facility.  Thus, the training does not expose the students to OSHA’s 
recommended five domain of safety. Hence, the majority of these young engineers have 
been working in the labs or workshops without the proper training.  Neglecting in the 




4.2 Goal two: Evaluate the student design team members’ safety knowledge 
The students were asked about workshop and laboratory safety procedures.  The 
question were aiming at identifying students’ knowledge of material safety and data 
sheets (MSDS), facility evacuation procedures, wearing protective equipment, and 
machine guarding requirements.  When evaluating students’ response, only 47% of the 
students were able to identify the safety requirements for laboratory or workshop task 
execution.  The responses to the survey question were common sense or previous 
knowledge based on exposure to similar training session.  Hence, the students do not 
acquire the necessary work safety procedures and knowledge as well, where it essential to 
properly response in case of hazardous material spill, machine guard while idle, or 
evacuation exit route and assembly point. .  
 
4.3 Goal three: Evaluate the student design team members’ safety attitude 
The questionnaire had a self-reporting section for students to describe their 
attitude toward safety.  70% of the participants did not answer that question; the reaming 
30% indicated that they would often follow safety procedures while they are in 
workshops or labs working on their projects. Their notion of not being hurt and assuring 
that work is performed safely dictated their response.  However, 73% of the respondents 
to the safety attitude question would follow the procedures occasionally.  The remaining 
27% would adhere to the procedures only when they are mandated.  This is an indication 
that the students executing laboratory experiments underestimate the potential 
consequences when violating procedures.  Thus, they tend to take short cuts to perform 
the required laboratory experiments by taking advantage of not being supervised or 
mornitered.  This shows that students lack the proper safety attitude and self-
consciousness toward executing laboratory assignments in positive safe behavior.  
 
4.4 Goal four: Evaluate the student design team members’ safety consciousness 
The respondents were requested to evaluate their overall safety consciousness. 
Spector (1994) argues that self-reporting questionnaire may portrait what the respondent 
would think is the correct to emphasize on social-desirability and can be bias in response.  
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Yet, studies indicated that self-reporting questionnaire indicates respondent’s truthfulness 
by reporting their non-adherence without being disciplined (Goodman, Meltzer, & 
Bailey, 1998).  The results of the questionnaire regarding the overall safety consciousness 
showed that 58% of the respondents find themselves as safety conscious.  Twenty five 
percent of the participants indicated they are very conscious.  However, participant who 
consider themselves very conscious were only 3% and the remaining participant 
indicated that they are neutral when it comes to evaluating themselves in terms of overall 
self-consciousness.  
 
5. UTILIZING BEST PRACTICES 
Training cards are certificates indicating that the user has successfully passed and 
approved and accredited safety program modules to perform the required task for both 
petroleum and process industries (API.org, 2041).  The program aims at recognizing 
individuals who are competent to execute the required tasks as per safety standards and 
procedures (API.org, 2041).  Due to its hazardous environment, the industries are 
committed to zero accidents and do not tolerate negligence (Vinnem, Hestad, Kvaløy, & 
Skogdalen, 2010).  The cards enables the user to perform tasks once the facility 
supervisor issues “permit-to-work” document.  The document assures that hazards are 
acknowledged and controlled; hence, the premises are safe to proceed with activities 
(Health and Safety Services, 2014).   
Industrial laboratories utilize different practices to minimize potential risks and 
assure that hazards are contained within tolerable limits.  Permit to work system is 
documentation system to administer activities on facilities to prevent accidents (Permit to 
work systems, 2014).  The University of Reading (2011) applies permit to work  system 
prior to using labs and workshops for activities in these facilities. The form will identify 
all hazards in the premises and certifies, to the lab or workshop user, that all safety 
precautions have been considered to perform the tasks with any recommendation of PPE 
or any related safety measures (Health and Safety Services, 2014). This document 
enables lab and workshop supervisors to manage access to their families and identify 
potential hazards that the users might encounter during performing their routine activities 





The analyses of the results show that science students in college workshops and 
laboratories receive informal safety training prior to participating in either laboratory 
experiments or participating in design teams’ machine shops.  The outcome of this is 
often ineffective, where accidents in university laboratories or machine shops still occur.  
This is an indication that these types of training sessions do not always assure positive 
safety attitude or safety performance. As a result, the frequent neglect of minimum safety 
requirements in machine shops or laboratories can result in avoidable accidents and 
losses.  
In addition, the survey showed that the young engineers’ knowledge of five 
domains of the OSHA guidelines: PPE, lockout/tagout, MSDS, machine guarding, and 
emergency action plan was insufficient. Lack of knowledge in these minimum essential 
domains can cause undesired consequences when accidents occur and the students fail to 
adhere to the proper safety guidelines.  Consequently, the lack of overall safety attitude is 
reflected in their attitude toward risk associated with their shop projects and class 
assignments.  Hence, the students underestimate the potential consequences when 
positive safety attitude is not part of their work ethic behavior to execute assigned tasks 
safely. 
Furthermore, utilizing administrative system, such as training cards and permit-to-
work, can add successive layers of defense and safeguard (Altabbakh et. al, 2013).  
Hence, adding different layer of protection to perform tasks can mitigate potential 
consequences due to prior knowledge of existing hazards.  Thus, both lab and/or 
workshop supervisors and students are held liable for the executing tasks, which can raise 
safety cautiousness and better understanding of potential failure consequences.   
As a result, training should be conducted through highly skilled, experienced, and 
competent safety professionals rather than randomly selected organization with informal 
training that is based on general knowledge (Fanning, 2012; Robotham, 2001; Cekada, 
2011). In order to reap the fruits of safety culture, it is essential to implement such culture 
for novice engineers in their college education.  Serious chemical or laboratory incidents 
are often thought to be the result of a weak or deficient safety culture; a principal root 
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cause of the incident (Committee on Chemical Safety, 2012). Implementing an effective 
safety culture is essential to protect employees as well as enhancing the students’ safety 
awareness. Students need to be able to identify hazards, assess the risk associated with 
them, and respond to an emergency situation if the occur. 
Industry would benefit from a new breed of engineer and scientist with safety 
culture and awareness ingrained in them. Today’s young engineers are future decision 
makers and managers.  Creating a safety-awareness environment and exposing them to 
real accident case studies will impact their thinking process toward decision-making and 
risk management.  Training them in college can shape their safety attitude positively and 
influence organizational culture as they are promoted up the ranks. Their commitment 
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V. BRIDGING THE HEALTH, SAFETY, AND ENVIRONMENT RISK 
MANAGEMENT PROFICIENCY GAP FOR FUTURE PETROLEUM 
ENGINEERS  
Mohammad AlKazimi 









Health, Safety, and Environment Risk Management performance has become 
essential in the upstream industry due to the evolving complexity of the processes.  In the 
recent years, accidents in the oil and gas industries resulted in catastrophic consequences 
as they captured the news and had an overwhelming impact to health, environment, 
financial, and social aspects of both the companies and their customers.  Health, Safety 
and Environment Risk Management specialist and professionals play a major role in 
mitigating both risk and consequences of hazards as they assure the companies comply 
with different standards and perform best-recommended practices.  Most of these 
professionals are engineers with different disciplines who have undergone intensive 
training courses by their employer as part of professional development programs.  
Subsequently, they continue their career path as HSE specialists once they successfully 
complete the program.  Unfortunately, there is a gap where academia lacks the adequate 
educational knowledge base in Health, Safety and Environment Risk Management to 
establish the necessarily knowledge for potential candidates in that field.  This paper 
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defines the establishment of “Health, Safety and Environment Risk Management in the 
Oil Industry” course in the Petroleum Engineering Department at Missouri University of 
Science and Technology.  Not only it is designed to cover the technical aspects of HSE in 
the oil and gas industry, but it also enhances soft skills many students tend to overlook 
such as  communications skills, safety awareness, ethical responsibilities, and most 
importantly, creating safety culture by exposing HSE awareness and knowledge to cater 
for the oil and gas industry.  This course will be the corner stone for establishing a new 
petroleum engineering focus area where the department tries to expand it into a certificate 
program by collaborating with other departments on campus which offer different 




The ongoing industrial evolution made processes more complex as organizations 
strive to integrate Environmental, Health and Safety Risk Management as part of their 
corporate responsibility to their staff (Health and Safety Executives, 2012).  As a result, 
organizations find challenges, to continuously, manage HSE issues due to cost and 
duration as they become more liable for any failure that can endanger either their 
employees or the public welfare (Cheremisinoff & Cnaffia, 1995).  The stakeholders in 
the oil and gas industry ranging from employees, governments, and communities, are 
closely monitoring the Health, Safety and Environment Risk Management performance 
as demand continues for “world-class performance and operational-excellence”  (Beull, 
2006).  British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico was an example of 
both management and engineering failure.  Hence, it was their responsibility to mitigate 
any hazardous failure and protect the human health and environment by adequately 
utilizing their knowledge and proficiency (Kavianian et al., 1993). 
The demand for more HSE engineers to be part of the oil and gas industry is 
increasing.  The expansion of the oil industry resulted in a scarcity of these engineers to 
overlook both the performance of process operations and potential risk management 
strategies.  This paper defines the establishment of a new focus area in Health, Safety, 
and Environment Risk Management in the Petroleum Engineering Department at 
Missouri University of Science and Technology.  The goal of the program is to meet the 
job market demand for engineers in that focus area in petroleum engineering.  In addition, 
the availability of the  program will enhance student’s communications skills, safety 
awareness, ethical responsibilities, and most importantly, creating  an improved safety 
culture by exposing different Health, Safety and Environment Risk Management 
awareness and knowledge specifically  to cater for the oil and gas industry. 
The Department of Petroleum Engineering at Missouri S&T approached different 
professional societies and concerned oil companies to construct a course that fits the 
industry’s need for highly skilled and qualified petroleum engineers.  The goals are 
assuring that the suggested curriculum topics meet the job market needs, meeting the 
required roles and responsibilities of the job description of potential candidates, and to 
fulfill both societal and legislative demands (Johnson, 2001).  
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The existence of a professional safety advocacy will introduce students to the 
importance of safety in the industry as it illustrates to them how it became an 
indispensable state of mind in numerous industries.  Consequently, the new program will 
bridge the gap between both  industry and academia by preparing a new breed of 
petroleum engineers who are aware of ethics, associated risks managements, decision 
consequences, and Health, Safety and Environment Risk Management related issues that 
can impact on operations.    
 
Background 
Accidents in the process industries can result in catastrophic consequences 
(Rodrigues & Simmons, 2012).  In the previous years, they captured the news and 
resulted in an overwhelming impact to on the health, environmental, financial, and social 
aspects of both the companies and their customers. The ConocoPhillips’ Bohai Bay in 
China’s east coast, Pemex’s spill in the Mexican Bay of Campeche, and China National 
Petroleum Corporation in Xingang Harbour are just a few examples of major accidents in 
the petroleum industry (Anderson & LaBelle, 1994). The most current accident was by 
BP’s Deepwater Horizon, an offshore drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico, which was 
performing drilling operations (Davies, 2010).  The disaster was caused by a loss of 
control over the pressure in the well. This loss of control was followed by the failure of 
the well's blowout preventer; Blowout preventers (BOPs) are standard safety equipment 
on any offshore facility. BOPs are “engineering control system” (Fthenakis, 1993, p. 7) 
consisting of both a series of valves and hardened steel sheering surfaces to cut through 
the pipeline.  The accident is considered the largest offshore oil spill in US history 
(Snow, 2010). 
Once an organization syndicates different factors such as HSE proficiency, 
management systems and processes, developmental psychology, and technology, and 
then it is heading toward establishing an organizational culture (Beull, 2006).  Thus, 
creating a strong HSE culture requires not only commitment, but also a continuous 
development, monitoring and improvement in all aspects as part of “HSE cultural 
maturity level.” (Beull, 2006).  Hence, the benefit of having this culture will result in a 
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progressive impact on productivity where reducing workers injuries results in less 
downtime.  It also diminishes incapacity expenses and the hidden overheads from lower 
employee self-esteem (Sandoe, 2012). The oil and gas industry is booming, yet, facing 
both a dearth of technical specialists and an aging workforce (Gould, et al., 2006).   The 
need for more petroleum engineers with, HSE focus area is needed to compensate for the 
shortage in skilled technical workforce.  Thus, as these engineers progress in their career, 
they embed awareness and safety culture with their acquired knowledge.  
 
The role of HSE professionals 
By recognizing hazards, HSE professional evaluate, develop recommendations for 
controlling, and advise members of the management team on means to mitigate the risk 
of hazards while adhering to regulations.  HSE professionals can focus on different areas 
within their discipline, industrial hygienists, occupational safety, fire protection 
engineering, environmental safety, human factor engineers, construction safety, 
institutional safety management are few examples of the potential fields HSE 
professionals can focus on for future career (American Society of Safety Engineers, 
2007).  As a result, these specialties can enhance the work place safety by focusing on 
making it more user-friendly to workers' compensation, turnover, absenteeism, and other 
major cost optimization (MacLeod, 1994).  Such professions requires an extensive 
knowledge in different Health, safety and environment codes along with risk assessment 
tools to identify and control hazards (Harms-Ringdahl, 2004). 
 
Potential job market for HSE professionals  
There are different sectors HSE engineers can engage in; public sectors and 
federal/state agencies benefit from their expertise especially in emergency response and 
crisis management teams.  Research and technology institutions are another field to look 
into for a career.  Chemical processing and oil gas companies have an escalating demand 
for HSE engineers due to the large magnitude of damage these industries can cause in 
case of an accident.  The aviation and commercial aircraft industries demand for HSE 
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engineers; airplane manufacturing process, luggage handling and other related aviation 
activities some of the tasks that needs to be addressed by HSE professionals.  The level of 
complexity and operations in the nuclear power industry strongly benefit for the 
knowledge and expertise HSE professionals as they strive to prevent accidents and cater 
for a safe working environment. 
The HSE profession was originated from the industrial engineering discipline.  
However, the HSE has grown tremendously from the 1980s to include several specialties 
that can enhance the working environment in a safe manner to optimize work 
performance (Health and Safety Executives, 2012).   
 
HSE professionals’ background    
As the HSE profession developed over the decades to cover different industries, it  
become  a multidisciplinary field requiring broad knowledge in areas such as the 
physical, chemical, biological and behavioral sciences, mathematics and engineering 
(Dembe, 1996). However, HSE professionals come from a wide variety of undergraduate 
and graduate degree programs, including biology, chemistry, management, psychology, 
occupational safety and health, and engineering. According to the American society of 
safety engineers, 34,000 members are safety professionals and approximately 1,250 of 
them are licensed professional engineers. 
 
Approaching the Industry: The HSE education within the South Central region 
Among the four University of Missouri System Campuses; Columbia, Kansas 
City, Saint Louis, and Rolla, none of them grant a degree in Health Safety and 
Environment to their students (ASSE, 2007).  When looking at other colleges in 
Missouri, only Metropolitan Community Colleges in Kansas City, MO, offers an 
Associate in Applied Science (AAS), and not a Bachelor of Science, Environmental 
Health and Safety.  Therefore, Missouri University of Science and Technology will 
establish a new path for its future students to enroll in a highly desired and sought 
discipline in various industries such as manufacturing, aviation, maritime, pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology.  In addition, the discipline will create a diverse population within the 
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university campus by attracting more female students seeking a degree in Industrial 
Hygiene, Occupational health, or Health Physics (Jennings, 2002) 
 
Establishing HSE Curriculum 
Students in the Petroleum Engineering program at Missouri University of Science 
and Technology undergo intensive courses in oil and gas drilling, production, reserves 
estimation, and the prediction of future production.  Additionally, they study the 
technology of well logging, well testing, well stimulation, petroleum reservoir 
engineering, secondary and tertiary recovery and geology.  In order to keep up with 
ongoing changes in the industry, a continuous evaluation of the curriculum takes place to 
stay competitive and up-to-date (Missouri University of Sciene and Technology, 2012).   
Conferences or symposia represent an excellent opportunity for faculty to hear from 
experts about the latest innovation in technology.  Thus, the open forums in these 
gatherings are an excellent tool to evaluate the current curriculum to sustain the best 
practices from some of the leading oil companies.  
 The Petroleum Engineering department at Missouri University of Science and 
Technology noticed the importance of HSE in the oil and gas industry.  Thus, the 
shortage in HSE specialist and professionals in the industry was seen as a perceived 
demand to take this program into consideration (Bihani, 2013).  In a vision to bridge the 
gap between both academia and the oil and gas industry, the department approached 
different experts in the Health, Safety and Environment Risk Management in major oil 
companies and professional societies to assist in constructing an introductory course in 
that field.  The goal of the course is to expose students to different essential topics related 
to Health, Safety and Environment Risk Management in the oil industry.  Thus, provide 
the industry with new breed of engineers having safety culture imbedded within.  As a 
result, the department established a new introductory course to be taught in 2014 
academic year.    
“Risk Management in the Oil Industry” is an introductory course that exposes 
petroleum engineering students to different technical aspects of HSE in the oil and gas 
industry.  The overarching goals of the course are enhancing overlooked soft skills that 
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most engineers lack according to a recent study conducted by Altabbakh and Grantham 
(2012).  Communications skills, safety awareness, unconventional problem solving, and 
ethical responsibilities are some of the skills that the course will focus on.  In addition, 
constructing a safety culture will be featured by exposing the students to HSE awareness 
topics and broadening their knowledge base to cater for the oil and gas industry 
(Altabbakh & Grantham, 2012).  In order to reach these goals, a new curriculum 
containing the essential oil and gas HSE topics was developed, in collaboration with 
Health, Safety, and Environment Risk Management experts in the industry, to be 
presented to students.  The course will cover different important aspects such working 
environment and safety.  This topic will consist of containing, storing and transporting 
biohazardous materials.  Thus, students will be aware of different occupational safety in 
terms of allowable exposure and threshold limits of noise, fumes, and other materials 
existing in the oil field facilities.    
Moreover, personal safety is another concerned topic especially in hazardous and 
highly flammable areas.  With the help of a certified Occupational Safety and Health 
Administrator (OSHA) expert, students will have hands on class on different personal 
protective equipment and how to use them accordingly in case of emergency. The human 
factors in executing tasks on site, working in heights, and confined space entry are some 
essential topics the students will learn in personal safety aspect of the course 
(Occupational Safety and Health Administrator, 2014). 
Students will be exposed to a range of topics concerned with Process Safety.  
Assuring operations and process safety, evaluating potential risks, and implement the 
proper management of change are some of the topics concerned with assuring safe 
process operations.  Thus, the students will acquire the different risk assessment tools and 
proper mitigation strategies to minimize resulting consequences.  Best practices in work, 
adapted by professional societies’ standards, are a recourse of assuring process safety 
which students will encounter. 
In addition, the course will cover different managerial skills and corporate 
responsibilities.  Engineering ethics and case studies in engagement with potential 
constituent and company’s stakeholders will enhance students’ soft skills.  Thus, they 
will be able to provide justifiable resolutions to any type of conflict within an 
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organization as they learned different negotiation skills and techniques in organizational 
leadership.   
Thus, the course will satisfy HSE vocational qualifications (VQ’s) by offering 
more practical learning experience to the student as they gain the necessary knowledge 
and skills in that area (Health and Safety Executive, 2009).  Moreover, the students will 
have an advantage in applying their gained skills and knowledge where the industry 
needs it in quality assurance, risk assessment and mitigation, and management of change 
where standards and best practices are in continuous evaluation to keep up with human-
system interaction technological advancement (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2012).   
The  topics offered in the this course will be the corner stone for establishing new 
HSE focus area in the petroleum engineering department .  Thus, the department strives 
into expanding its potential with this initiative to offer a graduate certificate program in 
HSE.  This broader goal can be achieved by collaborating with other departments on 
campus who offer different courses on variety of topics related to HSE. 
There are several courses at Missouri University of Science and Technology that 
focus on Health, safety, and Environment Risk Management.  Different Departments 
offer these courses, both on campus and via distance learning.  The Department of 
Psychological Science offers a “Psych-315 Environmental Psychology” class where 
students learn about environmental attitudes, perception, cognition, environmental 
influences, crowding, and applying different environmental designs to working 
environments (Missouri University of Science and Technology, 2012). 
Also the Civil, Architectural, and Environmental Engineering offer several classes 
related to Health, Safety, and Environment Risk Management.  One of these classes is 
“CE-360 Environmental Law and Regulations” where the class exposes students to 
comprehensive coverage of federal and international environmental laws and regulations 
concerning smog and wastewater.  Hence, the students will learn how the industry 
performs its operations within compliance protocols both domestically and 
internationally (Missouri University of Science and Technology, 2012).  In addition, the 
department offers “Remediation of Contaminated Groundwater and Soil” class where the 
students study case studies in applied remediation technologies.  Moreover, the issue of 
solid waste management and the methods used for their collection, reclamation, and 
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ultimate disposal is the focus of “CE-363 Solid Waste Management.”  Both  “CE 366: 
Indoor Air Pollution” and “CE 368: Air Pollution Control” introduce students to different 
applications to controlling emission from fossil fuels and various engineering analyses to 
minimize exposure to different types of pollutants (Missouri University of Science and 
Technology, 2012). 
Additionally the Engineering Management and System Engineering Department 
offer courses that focus on reliability, risk analysis, and risk assessment.  “EMGT-350 
Risk Assessment and Reduction” explores techniques for systematically identifying 
hazards and estimating risk improve the safety performance and security of 
manufacturing facilities.  “EMGT-381 Management and Methods in Reliability” provides 
students with basic concepts in reliability as they apply to the efficient operation of 
industrial systems.  Accordingly, “EMGT-386 Safety Engineering Management” focuses 
on principles of safety engineering applied to the industry in different aspects.  Job safety 
analysis, reduction of accident rates, protective equipment, safety rules and regulations, 
environmental hazards, health hazards, and ergonomic hazards are some of the topics 
addressed in this course.   
When combining these courses with the current petroleum engineering courses, 
they become a foundation to form a new Health, Safety and Environment Risk 
Management engineering focus area the Petroleum engineering department.  Students can 
take the assigned number of courses as part of science and technology elective courses 
which can be granted toward a minor in Health, Safety and Environment Risk 
Management while earning either undergraduate or graduate degree in petroleum 
engineering.   
 
Conclusion 
As the Petroleum industries become systematically more complex, the need for 
Health, Safety, and Environment specialists has become critical as part of the task force.  
The proposed launch of Health, Safety, and Environment focus area in the Petroleum 
Engineering Department at Missouri University of Science and Technology will boost the 
credentials of both the department and the university as pioneers in that in that field 
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within the South Central region.  In addition, students will be exposed to different HSE , 
as they will enhance their communications skills, safety awareness, ethical 
responsibilities, and most importantly, creating safety culture by exposing HSE 
awareness and knowledge to cater for the oil and gas industry. 
The Petroleum Engineering Department at Missouri University of Science and 
Technology has approached major oil and gas companies, as well as experts in the HSE 
field, to sponsor the program while sharing their knowledge and expertise with the 
students to gain the utmost from this course.  Collaborating with both the industry and 
safety experts will promote safety culture within young engineers and enhance awareness 
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The petroleum industry needs to reevaluate the current accident causation, risk 
assessment and mitigation strategies to prevent, or mitigate, major industrial accidents.  
The research focuses on investigating the validity of introducing different tools to address 
hazards and risks from different perspectives.  Hence, when considering the current 
accident causation models, STAMP exceeds conventional accident causation methods by 
pinpointing the reasons of human performance and component failure and takes it to 
another level of investigation.  The model goes beyond acknowledging these factors and 
adds organizational hierarchy, working practices, and the roles and responsibility of each 
staff member in the organization.  
Due to the availability of organizational structure, industry standards, and 
industrial professional guidelines and best practices, STAMP was simple to apply in the 
oil industry case study above without the need for special analytical skills or expertise.  
Accordingly, each scenario was analyzed according to the corresponding industry 
standard or best practice to identify the safety violations resulted in the catastrophe.     
Accordingly, the impact of accidents on different scales urged the petroleum 
industry to innovate new risk assessment tools to prevent future failure from occurring.  
Risk in Early Design (RED), a product risk assessment tool, was applied to identify 
different failure modes that might interrupt operation in the oil and gas industry, 
especially in the design phase.  The tool successfully identified the failure modes for 
different historical major accidents as they impact the integrity of the selected 
component.  The results of the RED analyses were verified by the corresponding official 
accident reports.  Hence, the tool is a supporting tool and compliments other Process 
Hazard Analysis (PHA) tools currently used in the industry.   
However, RED is advantageous in generating a list of prelude risk assessment 
based on cataloged historical product failure record.  The proposed new method aspires in 
assisting both novice engineers and designers lacking the necessary experience.  The tool 
provides preliminary risk assessments and potential failure mode identification leverages 
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for electromechanical products based on archived knowledge of past failures.  The 
archived knowledge used to generate the RED risk results is mathematically associated to 
product function. This relationship to product function provides designers the ability to 
project failures related to their product’s function as early as the conceptual design stages 
and identify consequent mitigation strategies.   
Consequently, Generated Risk Event Effect Neutralization (GREEN) proposes 
common mitigation strategies.  These strategies can aid the end user to minimize the 
likelihood and/or consequence of the potential failure modes that can negatively impact 
process operations.  GREEN analysis was utilized to examine potential risk mitigation 
strategies in the petroleum industry.  The analysis successfully identified, via RED’s 
analysis of potential failure modes, the possible strategies to control these failures. In 
addition, the GREEN analysis was successful in providing the most common mitigation 
strategies utilized to minimize the likelihood and consequences, accordingly.   
The tool is advantageous in producing a list of prelude risk assessment based on 
cataloged historical product failure record, and their corresponding control strategies.  
Hence, the tool can assist novice engineers and decision makers in the upstream industry 
in recognizing potential failure modes in the process system and how to, accurately, 
mitigate their likelihood and consequence especially in the design conceptual design 
stages.  
Table 1 compares the currently used risk assessment and mitigation strategy 
selection tools in the petroleum industry with the tools addressed in this research.  Hence, 
the end user is able to compare and contrast each tool to fit his/her need when assessing 











Table 1. Risk assessment tools comparison 





 Depicts the cause and effect 
relationship between the 
root cause events 
 Qualitative and quantitative 
results 
 Focuses on single failure at 
a time 
 Difficult to failures related to human 
behavior 
 Time consuming and lengthy 
 Latent hazards are not addressed 







 Efficient when applied to 
overall system 
 Structured and detailed 
approach 
 Prioritizes product/process 
deficiencies 
 Identifies and eliminates 
potential failure modes 
early in the development 
phases approximation 
 Difficulty to construct with multiple 
components 
 Only considers hazards arising from 
single point failure modes rather than 
combinations of failures 
 Relies on people with detailed system 
knowledge. 
 Does not recognize failures due to 
operations. 
 Time consuming and lengthy 
 Expensive 





 Graphical representation to 
various systems 
 Clear links between 
management systems and 
safety are shown 
 Lengthy and complicated; especially 
for complex systems 
 Cannot identify how effective 
safeguard is 
 Need of user can oversee potential risks 









Identifies risks encountered in 
the entire system, broader 
approach                                                                    
- Easy to apply and very 
effective in exposing systemic 
problems                                                                 
- Accounts for human error                                                 
- Semi quantitative                                                                 
- Takes less time to evaluate 
complex systems qualitatively 
 The quantified output is an 
approximation - Requires experience in 
approximation of risk numbers 
excessive for simple or low-risk 
decisions 
 Relatively slow progress compared to 
other methods  
 Not so easy to perform as a team 
exercise 
 Time consuming 














 The team approach to a 
HAZOP makes it a 
multidisciplinary study 
 Systematic and rigorous. 
 Involves interaction of 
views from 
multidisciplinary experts. 
 Can be applied to a wide 
range of types of system. 
 Creates a detailed and 




 Requires a considerable amount of 
preparation. 
 Can rely heavily on the skills of the 
HAZOP Chairman 
 Can be time consuming and therefore 
expensive. 
 Can inhibit imaginative thinking and so 
certain kinds of hazards 
 No means to assess hazards involving 
interactions between different parts of a 
system or process 
 No risk ranking or prioritization 
capability 
 No means to evaluate effectiveness of 
current proposed safeguard 
 May need to interface HAZOP with 




Risk in Early 
Design (RED) 
 Utilizes historical 
knowledgebase to produce 
potential risks 
 Well-suited for novice 
engineers 
 Identifies risk in the early 
design phase 
 User friendly 
 Graphical illustration 
 
 Potential risk may be over or under 
quantified 







 Wide spectrum of 
mitigation strategies for 
single failure mode  





 user interface needs to be improved 
  No link to RED’s failure mode 
identification 
 Cataloged data needs periodic update 





















 Pinpointing the reasons at 
human performance and 
component failure 
 Adds organizational 
hierarchy, working 
practices, and the roles and 
responsibility of each staff 
member 
 Simple to apply 
 No need for special 
analytical skills or expertise 
 Identifies the violations 
against the existence safety 
constraints 
 More focused on enforcing 
safety constraints behavior 
in systems rather than 
preventing failures.  
 Accidents are viewed as a 
result of inadequate safety 
control 
 Assist in recognizing 
scenarios, inadequate 
controls, the dysfunctional 
interaction, and the 
incorrect process models 
 Must have access organization’s 
hierarchy, Policies, standards, and 
regulations.  
 Roles and responsibilities of each staff 
members not always available  
 Organization flow of communication 





On the other hand, investing in human capital is another tool to mitigate potential 
human errors and to be fully incorporated with design parameters since human-system 
interaction is part of the petroleum industry.  In order to establish such investment, the 
first step to bench mark the current knowledge base and safety attitude in students.  
Hence, the analyses of the survey results show that science students in college workshops 
and laboratories receive informal safety training prior to either participating in laboratory 
experiments or design teams’ machine shops.  The outcome of this is often ineffective, 
where accidents in university laboratories or machine shops still occur.  This is an 
indication that these types of training sessions do not always assure positive safety 
attitude or safety performance. As a result, the frequent neglect of minimum safety 
requirements in machine shops or laboratories can result in avoidable accidents and 
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losses.  In addition, the survey showed that the young engineers’ knowledge of five 
domains of the OSHA guidelines: PPE, lockout/tagout, MSDS, machine guarding, and 
emergency action plan was insufficient. Lack of knowledge in these minimum essential 
domains can cause undesired consequences when accidents occur and the students fail to 
adhere to the proper safety guidelines.  Consequently, the lack of overall safety attitude is 
reflected in their attitude toward risk associated with their shop projects and class 
assignments.  Hence, the students underestimate the potential consequences when 
positive safety attitude is not part of their work ethic behavior to execute assigned tasks 
safely.  Therefore, adequate training provided with skilled professionals shall enhance the 
implementation of safety culture; an essential to implement such culture for novice 
engineers in their college education.   
In addition, implementing an effective safety culture is essential to protect 
employees as well as enhancing the students’ safety awareness. Students need to be able 
to identify hazards, assess the risk associated with them, and respond to an emergency 
situation if the occur.  Therefore, The proposed launch of Health, Safety, and 
Environment focus area in the Petroleum Engineering Department at Missouri University 
of Science and Technology will boost the credentials of both the department and the 
university as pioneers in that in that field within the South Central region.  Students will 
be exposed to different HSE topics, besides enhancing their communications skills, safety 
awareness, ethical responsibilities, and most importantly, creating safety culture by 
exposing HSE awareness and knowledge to cater for the oil and gas industry. 
Collaborating with experts in the HSE field, to sponsor the program while sharing their 
knowledge and expertise with the students to gain the utmost from this course will 
promote safety culture within young engineers.  Moreover, enhance awareness in 
decision making, especially when it comes to understanding potential consequences ad 
associated risks. 
Currently, the petroleum industry is incorporating Enterprise Risk Management 
(ERM) system in as part of its integral corporate governance to mitigate different aspects 
of risk and to achieve targeted objectives.  The system look into different aspects of risks 
in terms of operational, financial, compliance, and governance.  Hence, encompassing 
such trend within corporate strategic plan to ensure potential risks are reduced 
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accordingly.  In addition, implementing an asset integrity management system to assure 
the mechanical/electrical integrity of equipment is necessary to mitigate potential 
failures.   
On the overhand, the human aspect of operational safety is essential when 
designing any system.  Hence, combining all these risk assessment tools and investing in 
the human capital is the aim of bridging potential gaps between academia and the 
industry.  Hence, the petroleum industry would benefit from a new breed of engineer and 
scientist with safety culture and awareness ingrained in them. Today’s young engineers 
are future decision makers and managers.  Therefore, creating a safety-awareness 
environment, and exposing them to real accident case studies, will impact their thinking 
process toward decision-making and risk management.  Training them in college can 
shape their safety attitude positively and influence organizational culture as they are 
promoted in the professional ladder.  As a result, their decision paradigm shall be more 
tailored toward possible consequences that can affect operations.  Thus, their 
commitment towards safety have the potentials to make a great impact creating a safer 
working environment for the operating facility’s surrounding community, workforce and 
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